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I.  Introduction 
 
On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda operatives attacked civilian and military targets on US 
territory, causing thousands of deaths and billions of dollars of economic loss.  The next day, the 
United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 characterizing the attack 
by Al Qaeda as a “threat to international peace and security” and recognizing the right of states 
to use armed force in self defense.3  NATO, for the first time in its history, invoked the 
obligation of collective self defense under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.4  On September 14, the 
US Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, authorizing the President to 
use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks. . . .” 5  Terrorism, 
conceived until then as crime, was reconceived—as war.   
On November 13, 2001, invoking the law of war, President Bush announced that enemy 
combatants in the US “war on terror” would be subject to trial by military commission—a form 
of military tribunal last convened in the aftermath of World War II.  Issuing a Presidential 
Military Order (PMO), he stated:  
                                                 
1 © Madeline Morris 2007.  
2 Professor of Law, Duke Law School. 
3 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12 2001). 
4  Press Release, North Atlantic Council, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sep. 12, 2001), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm. 
5 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) §§ 1–2. 
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To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective 
conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is 
necessary for individuals subject to this order pursuant to section 2 hereof to be 
detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other 
applicable laws by military tribunals. . . .  
The term ‘‘individual subject to this order’’ shall mean any individual 
who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I determine from time 
to time in writing that: 
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times, 
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida; 
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of 
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, 
threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse 
effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, 
or economy; or 
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in 
subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and 
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to 
this order. 6  
 
 The military commissions set in place pursuant to that PMO were struck down by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld7 on June 24, 2006.  Three months later, under 
pressure from the White House,8 Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 20069 
(MCA) establishing a new set of military commissions, this time with Congressional sanction.  
The MCA established and governs the military commissions now in operation at the US Naval 
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
The MCA provisions defining the personal jurisdiction of military commissions are not 
nearly as breezy as the provisions of the PMO that would have allowed military commission 
                                                 
6 President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the 
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831, 57,833-34 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
7 548 U.S. 557, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006). 
8 See Message From The President of The United States Transmitting a Draft of Proposed Legislation Entitled The 
"Military Commissions Act Of 2006”, H. Doc. No. 109–133, 109th Cong.; 2d Sess., at 6273 (Sept. 7, 2006); Karl 
Hulse & Kate Zernike, House Passes Detainee Bill As It Clears Senate Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2006,  p. A20. 
(“The bill was a compromise worked out between the White House and three Senate Republicans who for weeks 
had resisted the administration’s approach. They contended the White House’s initial bill would violate the 
Constitution and redefine the nation’s obligations under the Geneva Conventions, signaling to other nations that they 
too could rewrite the rules on dealing with combatants seized in wartime.”).  
9 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950w). 
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jurisdiction over any alien to be determined “from time to time” by the President.  The MCA’s 
provisions governing personal jurisdiction, in fact, are exigent, specific, and faithful to the law of 
war, when properly interpreted.  The problem is that they also are remarkably opaque in their 
wording.  At the present writing, a year and a half after passage of the MCA, the regime 
governing the personal jurisdiction of military commissions is as controversial as it is unclear.10   
None of the parties to the controversy have called into question the Charming Betsy 
canon of statutory construction, which requires that, “[a]n act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”11   Indeed, the 
Court of Military Commissions Review (CMCR), established under the MCA as the military 
commissions’ appellate body, invoked the Charming Betsy doctrine in its first (and, to date, 
only) opinion construing the MCA. 
 But, none of the opinions rendered by the military commissions or the CMCR actually 
has offered a comprehensive analysis of the substantive and procedural requirements for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction by military commissions under the international law of war.  
Without such an articulation of the relevant law, attempts to interpret the MCA’s jurisdictional 
provisions “consistently” with international law have been something of a muddle.  The result 
has been not only significant disarray in the functioning and jurisprudence of the military 
commissions but, also, damage to the integrity of the law of war— including, particularly, 
prisoner-of-war (POW) protections.   
 The present article, in Part II, delineates the law of war governing the personal 
jurisdiction of military commissions.  Part III parses the jurisdictional language of the MCA and 
argues that, properly construed, the personal jurisdictional framework of the MCA is both 
                                                 
10 See infra Part IV.  
11 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
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internally coherent and entirely consistent with the law of war.  Part IV examines the relevant 
opinions rendered by the Guantanamo military commissions and the CMCR to date in the light 
of the law of war and the interpretation of the MCA delineated in Part III.  Part V demonstrates 
that, in each case brought under the MCA to date, military commission jurisdiction has been 
exercised over a presumptively lawful combatant, in violation of both the MCA and the law of 
war—with resulting damage to the law of war, the integrity of American governance, and the 
reputation of the US internationally.  Part VI concludes by suggesting a remedy that is as simple 
as it is critical. 
This article does not question the wisdom of applying the law of war to the context of 
jihadist terrorism—though there is much to question.  Rather, the present article assumes 
arguendo that detained ‘combatants’ are to be prosecuted before military commissions, pursuant 
to the MCA, and provides an analysis of what is required if those prosecutions are to be lawful.   
II.  Military Commission Jurisdiction under the International Law of War 
The law of war exists to reduce human suffering in armed conflict.  Those taken prisoner 
by the enemy are vulnerable to profound brutality by their captors.  The law of war, to the extent 
it is effective, provides protection for those held in enemy control. 
All persons held by enemy forces in armed conflicts are entitled, under the law of war, to 
a minimal standard of humane treatment.12  Only “lawful combatants” held by the enemy, 
however, are entitled to POW status and its attendant rights and privileges.13  
                                                 
12 See Common Article 3, Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Protocol I 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, art. 75, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “Protocol I”].  See also U.S. v. Hamdan, supra 
note 7 at 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2796.  
13 See, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter “POW Convention”].   
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The criteria for lawful combatant status are delineated in Article 4 of the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POW Convention).14  A combatant 
who falls within those criteria is a lawful combatant.  A lawful combatant who falls into the 
hands of the enemy is entitled to POW status.  Under the law of war, a lawful combatant held by 
the enemy is a POW.  
                                                 
14 Article 4 of the POW Convention states:   
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, 
who have fallen into the power of the enemy: 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming 
part of such armed forces. 
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance 
movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory 
is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the 
following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the 
Detaining Power. 
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of 
military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible 
for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization, from the armed forces which 
they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model. 
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil 
aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of 
international law. 
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist 
the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms 
openly and respect the laws and customs of war. 
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under 
the present Convention: 
(1) Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occupying Power 
considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while 
hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such persons have made an 
unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where 
they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment. 
(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by 
neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international 
law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the 
exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the 
Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting 
Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be 
allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without 
prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage 
and treaties. 
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of 
the present Convention. 
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POWs benefit from POW rights only when POW status is acknowledged.  The 
safeguards and procedures governing combatant status determinations under the law of war, 
therefore, form the linchpin of all POW protections.   
The core safeguard for POW rights under the law of war turns on a presumption.  A 
combatant held in the control of the enemy is presumed to be a lawful combatant, entitled to 
POW protections, unless and until he or she is determined, through a specified legal procedure, 
to lack POW status.15 
The one procedure through which the presumption of entitlement to POW rights may be 
rebutted is a determination by a “competent tribunal” that the person does not come within the 
criteria for lawful combatant status.  Article 5 of the POW Convention, thus, states: 
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act 
and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories 
enumerated in Article 4 [defining lawful combatants], such persons shall enjoy 
the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal.16 
 
Only when a detained combatant has been determined, by a “competent tribunal,” to lack lawful 
combatant status may that detainee be treated as a non-POW.   
The primary goal motivating the promulgation of Article 5, in 1949, was the 
establishment of a system in which combatant status determinations would be made by a tribunal 
of several people rather than by an individual decision maker.17  As explained in the official 
Commentary to the POW Convention, the drafters of Article 5 sought to ensure, “that decisions 
which might have the gravest consequences should not be left to a single person . . . .”18 
                                                 
15 See POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 5; Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 45(1). 
16 POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 5. 
17 See COMMENTARY TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR  77 
(HTTP://WWW.ICRC.ORG/IHL.NSF/COM/375-590008?OPENDOCUMENT) (hereinafter, Commentary to the POW 
Convention). 
18 Id. 
 7
 
Article 45(1) of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol I) 
reiterates the presumption of lawful combatant status applicable to every combatant who falls 
into the hands of the enemy, and restates that a competent tribunal determination is the sole 
means for rebutting that presumption that presumption.  Article 45(1) provides: 
A person who takes part in hostilities and falls into the power of an adverse Party 
shall be presumed to be a prisoner of war, and therefore shall be protected by the 
Third Convention, if he claims the status of prisoner of war, or if he appears to be 
entitled to such status, or if the Party on which he depends claims such status on his 
behalf by notification to the detaining Power or to the Protecting Power.  Should 
any doubt arise as to whether any such person is entitled to the status of prisoner of 
war, he shall continue to have such status and, therefore, to be protected by the 
Third Convention and this Protocol until such time as his status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal.19 
 
The U.S., while not a party to Protocol I, has stated explicitly and repeatedly that Article 45 
embodies binding, customary international law of war.20   
The presumption of lawful combatant status, and the bright-line rule that the presumption 
may be rebutted only by an article-5 competent tribunal, is explicitly adopted and implemented 
in regulations binding throughout the US armed forces.  Army Regulation 190-8  
(AR 190-8) provides: 
1-6. Tribunals 
                                                 
19 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, art. 45(1), Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “Protocol I”].   
The U.S., while not a party to Protocol I, has stated explicitly and repeatedly that the provisions of Article 
45 embody binding, customary international law of war, and are adopted and endorsed as such by the United States.  
See, e.g., Michael Matheson, The US Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Remarks before Session One of the Humanitarian Law Conference, 2 
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419 (1987) (stating, in his official capacity as Deputy Legal Adviser, US State 
Department that, “We do support the principle that, should any doubt arise as to whether a person is entitled to 
[lawful] combatant status, he be so treated until his status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”) 
20 See, e.g., Michael Matheson, The US Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Remarks before Session One of the Humanitarian Law 
Conference, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419 (1987) (speaking in his official capacity as Deputy Legal Adviser, US 
State Department). 
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a. In accordance with Article 5, [POW Convention], if any doubt arises as 
to whether a person, having committed a belligerent act and been taken into 
custody by the US Armed Forces, belongs to any of the categories 
enumerated in Article 4,  [POW Convention], such persons shall enjoy the 
protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal. 
b. A competent tribunal shall determine the status of any person not 
appearing to be entitled to prisoner of war status who has committed a 
belligerent act or has engaged in hostile activities in aid of enemy armed 
forces, and who asserts that he or she is entitled to treatment as a prisoner of 
war, or concerning whom any doubt of a like nature exists.21 
Like the other features of article 5, the requirement that an article 5 tribunal be composed 
of more than one person is implemented in AR 190-8, which states that a “competent tribunal” 
shall be “composed of three commissioned officers.”22 
AR 190-8 was jointly promulgated by the Headquarters of the departments of the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps on October 1, 1997.  The regulation states explicitly that it, 
“implements international law, both customary and codified, relating to [enemy prisoners of 
war].”23 
International law, U.S. law and military regulations, and longstanding U.S. policy could 
not be clearer:  A combatant detained by the enemy must be accorded POW rights unless and 
                                                 
21 ARMY REGULATION 190-8, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER 
DETAINEES § § 1-1(b), 1-6 (1 Oct 1997) (hereinafter AR 190-8).   
22 Id.  Aside from Army Regulation 190-8, the history of revisions to Army Field Manual 27-19 indicates that the 
military has consistently required that a “competent tribunal” consist of at least three officers since the term 
“competent tribunal”: was first added to the military lexicon.  For example, the Army Field Manual 27-10 dictated 
that status determinations must be made by a “competent authority” rather than a competent tribunal.  Field Manual 
27-10, Rules of Land Warfare (Washington: War Department, 1914), 23.  The same was true twenty years later.  
Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare (Washington: War Department, 1934), 5.  By 1940, however, an extra 
line of text was added specifying that “[t]he determination . . . is to be left to a higher military authority or to 
military tribunals.”  Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare (Washington: War Department, 1940), 5.  When 
the manual was revised again following the ratification of the Geneva Conventions, the section was changed to 
provide that unlawful status be “determined by a competent tribunal” alone.  Department of the Army Field Manual 
27-10, The Laws of Land Warfare (Washington: Department of the Army, 1956), 19, §71(a).  That text, which has 
remained constant since, further explains that “[a] ‘competent tribunal’ of the United States for the purpose of 
determining whether a person . . . is or is not entitled to prisoner-of-war status is a board of not less than three 
officers . . . .”  Id. at 19, §71(c). 
23 Id..   
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until the presumption of lawful combatant status is rebutted through a contrary combatant status 
determination by an article-5 competent tribunal composed of more than one person. 
The rights accorded to POWs include certain rights relating to criminal trials.  The POW 
Convention specifies that “[a] prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has 
been pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members 
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. . . .”24  Because POW rights thus include important 
protections relating to criminal trials, the recognition or denial of POW status is especially 
crucial for a detainee who is to stand trial.  In light of the heightened significance of POW status 
in that circumstance, the law of war provides that, if a detainee who has been determined by a 
competent tribunal to lack POW status is to stand trial for a crime arising from the hostilities, he 
is entitled to assert POW status and to have the question adjudicated in a de novo combatant 
status determination, conducted with full judicial process.25  The law of war thus requires a two-
tiered status determination system for cases where a detained combatant who is not held as a 
POW is to be tried for an offense arising out of the hostilities.  
This two-tiered system of combatant status determination is codified in Article 45 of 
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol I).  The first paragraph of 
Article 45, as discussed earlier, reiterates and elaborates upon the core safeguard articulated in 
Article 5 of the POW Convention—the presumption of lawful combatant status (i.e., POW 
status, if the individual is held by the enemy), which may be rebutted only by a contrary 
determination by a competent tribunal.   
                                                 
24 POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 102.   
25 See Protocol I, art. 45. 
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The second paragraph of Article 45 articulates the additional safeguard—the right to a 
combatant status adjudication before a judicial tribunal—for a detainee who is “not held as a 
prisoner of war” and is to be “tried for an offense arising out of the hostilities:” 
If a person who has fallen into the power of an adverse Party is not held as a 
prisoner of war and is to be tried by that Party for an offence arising out of the 
hostilities, he shall have the right to assert his entitlement to prisoner-of-war 
status before a judicial tribunal and to have that question adjudicated.  
Whenever possible under the applicable procedure, this adjudication shall 
occur before the trial for the offence.26 
 
That detainee—whom Article 45(2) specifies is “not held as a prisoner of war”—is, 
necessarily, either one who does not claim POW status or one who has been determined by a 
competent tribunal to lack POW status.  A detainee who claims POW status, as we have seen, 
may lawfully be held as a non-POW only if a competent tribunal has found him to be an unlawful 
combatant27 and, therefore, not entitled to POW status.  Consequently, the person, referred to in 
Article 45(2)—who asserts entitlement to POW status, but is “not held as a [POW]”—is, 
necessarily, a person who has already been found, by a competent tribunal, to lack POW status.  
A person in that situation, Article 45(2) provides, if he is to be tried for an offense arising out of 
the hostilities, “shall have the right to assert his entitlement to prisoner-of-war status before a 
judicial tribunal and to have that question adjudicated.”  The Article 45(2) status adjudication, 
therefore, is necessarily a separate proceeding, conducted subsequent to the competent tribunal 
determination that initially overcame the presumption of lawful combatant status and thereby 
permitted the detainee to be “not held as a POW.” 
                                                 
26 Id., art. 45(2) (emphasis added). 
27 The term “unlawful combatant” does not appear in the Geneva Conventions.  It is used here to refer, simply, to a 
combatant who does not come within the criteria for lawful combatant status.  As shall be discussed below, the 
criteria defining “lawful combatant” status under the MCA are narrower than those of the POW Convention.  The 
difference in criteria is not relevant for immediate purposes, but will be delineated as they become relevant, below.  
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The US has long endorsed the two-tiered status determination procedure codified in 
Article 45(2) of Protocol I as a binding feature of the customary international law of war, and has 
advocated its recognition and enforcement.28  Protocol I was negotiated in the wake of the severe 
mistreatment of US soldiers who were wrongfully denied POW status and summarily convicted 
as war criminals in North Vietnam.  “North Vietnam,” Howard Levie has written, “stated, in 
effect, that it would regard captured Americans as ‘pirates,’ people who have destroyed the 
property and massacred the population of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as major war 
criminals caught in flagrante delicto and liable for judgment in accordance with the laws of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.”29  In the light of that experience and analogous evasions of 
POW rights in the Korean war, Article 45(2) was promulgated, with US support and leadership, 
to strengthen POW protections by entitling a detainee to a public, judicial proceeding to 
determine combatant status—de novo—before that person could be tried for war crimes without 
POW rights at trial.30  Ambassador George Aldrich, head of the US delegation in the negotiation 
of Protocol I, recalls:  
[P]aragraph 2 of Article 45 of Protocol I . . . establishes a separate right of any 
person who has fallen into the power of an adverse party that intends to try him 
for an offense arising out of the hostilities to have his entitlement to POW status 
determined by a judicial tribunal. When that text was negotiated, the United States 
government was painfully aware of the experiences in Korea and Vietnam, where 
many American military personnel were mistreated by their captors and denied 
POW status by mere allegations that they were all criminals. 31 32   
 
                                                 
28 See infra, pp. 9–12.   
29 Howard S. Levie, The US Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Remarks before Session One of the Humanitarian Law Conference, 2 
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 533, 535 (1987). 
30 See George H. Aldrich, Editorial Comments: The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal 
Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 891, 898 (2002) 
31 George H. Aldrich, Comments on the Geneva Protocols, 320 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 508–10 (1997), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JNV2. 
32 Aldrich, supra note 25, at 898 [internal citations omitted]. 
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Because the US opposed some of the provisions of Protocol I as it was ultimately 
adopted, the US did not become a party to the treaty.  Yet there were certain provisions that the 
US not only supported, but viewed as crucially important.  The US, therefore, in 1987, identified 
and endorsed specific provisions of Protocol I as customary international law, and urged other 
states also to recognize those provisions as binding.33     
Article 45 of Protocol I featured prominently among the provisions that the United States 
so endorsed.  Delineating the US position on Protocol I, Michael Matheson, then-Deputy State 
Department Legal Adviser, unequivocally articulated the United States’ endorsement of:  the 
presumption of entitlement to POW rights for all combatants held by the enemy; the requirement 
that the presumption remain in force unless a contrary status determination is made by a 
competent tribunal; and, the right to a judicial adjudication of combatant status where an 
individual held as a non-POW is to be tried for crimes arising from the hostilities.34  As he 
stated:   
We do support the principle that, should any doubt arise as to whether a 
person is entitled to [lawful] combatant status, he be so treated until his status 
has been determined by a competent tribunal, as well as the principle that if a 
person who has fallen into the power of an adversary is not held as a prisoner 
or war and is to be tried for an offense arising out of the hostilities, he should 
have the right to assert his entitlement to prisoner-of-war status before a 
judicial tribunal and to have that question adjudicated.  Those principles are 
found in Article 45.35 
                                                 
33 See Michael Matheson, The US Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Remarks before Session One of the Humanitarian Law Conference, 2 
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419 (1987). 
34 Id. at 419–26. 
35 Id. at 425–26.  The Government suggested in its Reply to Amicus Curiae Brief in United States v. Khadr that, 
rather than endorsing Article 45 as customary international law, Mr. Matheson in fact “affirmatively disclaimed the 
‘customary’ legal effect of Article 45.”  Prosecution Reply to Amicus Curiae at 4, United States v. Khadr, CMCR 
07-001, 24 n. 38 (2007).  The Government quotes Mr. Matheson as saying:  
[W]e support the principle that persons entitled to combatant status be treated as [POWs] in 
accordance with the [POW Convention], as well as the principle that combatant personnel 
distinguish themselves from the civilian populations while engaged in military operations.  Those 
statements are, of course, related to but different from the content of Article[] 45 . . . .  Id. at 26. 
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State Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer elaborated:  “We therefore intend to 
consult with our allies to develop appropriate methods for incorporating these provisions . . . 
into rules that govern our military operations . . . .”36  The US has, indeed, incorporated the 
provisions of Article 45 into its regulations and operational guidelines37 and has identified those 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Government’s position on this point arises from confusion caused by an error (probably, 
typographical) in the text of Matheson’s remarks as published.  Looking at the full quotation—without the 
ellipses—provides some clarity.  Picking up where the Government’s quotation leaves off, the statement reads as 
follows. 
. . .  [R]elated to but different from the content of articles 44 and 45, which relax the requirements 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning prisoner-of-war treatment for irregulars, and, in 
particular, include a special dispensation allowing individuals who are said to be unable to 
observe this rule in some circumstances to retain combatant status, if they carry their arms openly 
during engagements and deployments preceding the launching of attacks. . . 
 On the other hand, we do support the principle that, should any doubt arise as to whether 
a person is entitled to combatant status, he be so treated until his status been determined by a 
competent tribunal, as well as the principle that if a person who has fallen into the power of an 
adversary is not held as a [POW] and is to be tried for an offense arising out of the hostilities, he 
should have a right to assert his entitlement to [POW] status before a judicial tribunal and to have 
that question adjudicated.  Those principles are found in article 45. Id., at 425-26 (emphasis 
added). 
Those two paragraphs of Matheson’s statement, as reproduced in the published text, are contradictory.  The first 
says that the US rejects the provisions of Article 45, and the second says that the US supports the provisions of Article 45.  
The contradiction was caused by the erroneous inclusion of the words “and 45” in the first paragraph of the quotation.  That 
this was in error becomes clear upon a cursory reading of Article 45.  Article 45 contains nothing that “relax[es] the 
requirements . . . concerning prisoner-of-war treatment for irregulars” or that “allow[s] individuals who are said to be unable 
to . . . distinguish themselves from the civilian populations in some circumstances to retain combatant status.”  Article 45, in 
fact, contains nothing relating to the requirements for prisoner-of-war status.35  In other words, the reference to Article 45 in 
the first paragraph quoted just makes no sense.  By contrast, Article 44, which is also cited in the first paragraph of the quote, 
consists of eight paragraphs defining the requirements for prison-of-war status, including several that relax the requirements 
concerning prisoner-of-war treatment for irregulars.  Subsection 3 of Article 44, in particular, states:  “[W]here . . . an armed 
combatant cannot so distinguish himself [from the civilian population], he shall retain his status as a combatant. . . .”  The 
logical conclusion is that only Article 44, and not Article 45, was supposed to be included in the first paragraph.   
This conclusion is borne out by another aspect of the first paragraph of the Matheson quotation.  Matheson states 
that “the executive branch regards this provision as highly undesirable . . . .”  Matheson apparently intended to refer to one 
article (“this provision”), not two, in the first paragraph.   
The authors confirmed this point, by telephone, with the State Department officials directly involved at that time.  
They confirmed that the reference to Article 45 in the first paragraph of the quotation was unintended. 
36 Abraham Sofaer, The US Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419, 471 (1987). 
37 See, e.g., AR 190-8, supra, note 20;  DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, NWP 1-14M: THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 11-3 (1995), available at http://lawofwar.org/naval_warfare_publication_N-
114M.htm, (“Should a question arise regarding a captive’s entitlement to prisoner of war status, that individual 
should be accorded prisoner-of-war treatment until a competent tribunal convened by the captor determines the 
status to which that person is properly entitled.  Individuals captured . . . as illegal combatants have the right to 
assert their claim of entitlement to prisoner-of-war status before a judicial tribunal and to have that question 
adjudicated.”) 
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provisions as reflecting customary international law.38  Most recently, the Court of Military 
Commissions Review cited the rights embodied in Article 45 as a part of the customary 
international law of war.39 
In sum, under the international law of war—endorsed and adopted as such by the US—all 
combatants held by enemy forces are presumed to be lawful combatants, entitled to POW rights 
and protections, from the time they are taken into captivity.  That presumption may be rebutted 
only through a determination of unlawful combatant status by a competent tribunal composed of 
more than one person.  A combatant who (pursuant to a competent tribunal determination) is 
held as a non-POW, and who is to be tried for crimes arising from the hostilities has the right to 
assert POW status and to have a de novo judicial adjudication of combatant status, separate and 
distinct from the status determination earlier made by a competent tribunal.  That status 
adjudication provides an added layer of protection against the wrongful deprivation of POW trial 
rights to a combatant who, in facing criminal prosecution by the enemy, is in a singularly 
vulnerable position. 
III.  Personal Jurisdiction under the MCA 
The personal jurisdictional framework of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 is not 
drafted as clearly as might have been hoped; and this has caused difficulty for the courts that 
have sought to apply it.  Nevertheless, when the MCA is read alongside the law of war, the 
jurisdictional structure of the Act becomes transparent and is revealed to be fully consistent with 
the requirements of the law of war, described in Part II, above.  
  The MCA provides that the military commissions established under the Act shall have 
jurisdiction only over unlawful combatants.40    In accordance with the law of war, the MCA 
                                                 
38 See, e.g., JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, JA 422 at 18-2 
(1997); JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, Ch. 2 (2002).   
39 United States v. Khadr, CMCR 07-001, 24 n. 38 (2007).  
 15
provides that lawful enemy combatants held by the US may be prosecuted only before the same 
courts—courts-martial—as US service members would be.41  The MCA could not be clearer on 
this point.  The stated purpose of the MCA is to establish, “procedures governing the use of 
military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants. . . .”42   The Act provides: “A 
military commission under this chapter shall have jurisdiction to try any offense made 
punishable by this chapter or the law of war when committed by an alien unlawful enemy 
combatant. . . .”43  In an abundance of caution, the Act further states that, “military commissions 
under this chapter shall not have jurisdiction over lawful enemy combatants.  Lawful enemy 
combatants who violate the law of war are subject to [courts-martial].”44  
The MCA, properly interpreted, requires a determination of unlawful combatant status by 
a competent tribunal as a prerequisite to the attachment of military commission jurisdiction, as is 
required under the law of war.45  The text and structure of the MCA support this interpretation.  
MCA § 948(d), entitled “Jurisdiction,” is composed of four points:  
‘‘§ 948d. Jurisdiction of military commissions 
‘‘(a) JURISDICTION.—A military commission under this chapter shall have 
jurisdiction to try any offense made punishable by this chapter or the law of 
war when committed by an alien unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or 
after September 11, 2001. 
‘‘(b) LAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANTS.—Military commissions under 
this chapter shall not have jurisdiction over lawful enemy combatants.  
Lawful enemy combatants who violate the law of war are subject to chapter 
47 of this title. Courts-martial established under that chapter shall have 
jurisdiction to try a lawful enemy combatant for any offense made punishable 
under this chapter. 
‘‘(c) DETERMINATION OF UNLAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANT 
STATUS DISPOSITIVE.—A finding, whether before, on, or after the date of 
the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, by a Combatant 
                                                                                                                                                             
40 10 U.S.C. § 948d(a). 
41 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
42 Id. § 948b(a).  
43 Id. § 948d(a). 
44 Id. § 948d(b).  
45 See infra remainder of Part III. 
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Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the 
authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense that a person is an 
unlawful enemy combatant is dispositive for purposes of jurisdiction for trial 
by military commission under this chapter. 
‘‘(d) PUNISHMENTS.—A military commission under this chapter may, 
under such limitations as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe, adjudge 
any punishment not forbidden by this chapter, including the penalty of death 
when authorized under this chapter or the law of war. 
 
The “Jurisdiction” provision, thus: delineates the subject-matter and personal jurisdiction of 
military commissions (the latter extending only to “alien unlawful enemy combatants”); indicates 
that lawful combatants are to be tried by courts-martial; provides that competent tribunal 
determinations of combatant status are “dispositive” for purposes of jurisdiction for trial by 
military commission;46 and, defines the punitive jurisdiction of commissions.   
The “Jurisdiction” section indicates that lawful combatants are to be sent for trial in one 
forum (courts-martial), and unlawful combatants in another (military commissions).  The 
definitions of “lawful combatant” and “unlawful combatant” are provided in a separate section of 
the Act, entitled “Definitions.”  The categorization of enemy combatants into two classes—
subject to trial in two distinct forums—necessitates a mechanism for determining, in each given 
case, the forum to which that prosecution should be sent.  A mechanism is required to direct the 
initial assignment of the case to one jurisdiction or the other.  The MCA specifies that the  
competent tribunal is the mechanism for making the initial status determination necessary to 
assign each case to a forum.  The MCA is not nearly as clear as it might have been on this crucial 
matter.   Nevertheless, the information is there and, when the Act is read alongside the law of 
war, its meaning is absolutely clear.  The initial determination for distinguishing between cases 
                                                 
46 See discussion, infra pp. 20-23. 
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to be referred to military commission and those to be referred to courts-martial must be made by 
a “Combatant Status Review Tribunal or other competent tribunal.”47 
This point needs to be examined in detail.  The MCA states:  “a finding . . . by a . . . 
competent tribunal . . . that a person is an unlawful enemy combatant is dispositive for purposes 
of jurisdiction for trial by military commission.”  That the competent tribunal finding is termed 
“dispositive” language might seem to suggest that, where there has been a prior (“dispositive”) 
competent tribunal determination, a military commission is precluded from adjudicating 
combatant status to determine its own jurisdiction.  In fact, the contrary is true.  The competent 
tribunal determination is, in the words of the MCA, “dispositive for purposes of jurisdiction for 
trial by military commission.”  Once that “jurisdiction for trial” is established by the competent 
tribunal determination, then, in the course of that trial, the military commission may, like any 
court, exercise jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction—including the de novo adjudication 
of combatant status where appropriate.  That de novo adjudication of status is consistent with the 
MCA, as is demonstrated below, and is required by the provisions of article 45(2), as shall be 
shown as well.  To see the full picture—and to understand how a “dispositive” competent 
tribunal determination is consistent with a subsequent, de novo, adjudication of status by a 
military commission, requires examining not only the MCA’s “Jurisdiction” section, but also its 
section on “Definitions.”   
 In a location remote from the section entitled “Jurisdiction,” the MCA articulates two 
definitions of the term “unlawful combatant”:  
‘‘§ 948a. Definitions 
‘‘In this chapter: 
                                                 
47 10 U.S.C. § 948d(c).    
 The distinction between Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) and other competent tribunals is not 
relevant for immediate purposes, but will be discussed in Part IV, infra.  
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‘‘(1) UNLAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANT.—(A) The term ‘unlawful enemy 
combatant’ means— 
‘‘(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and 
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-
belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person 
who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces);  
or 
‘‘(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful 
enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another 
competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the 
Secretary of Defense.48 
 
The two definitions are posed disjunctively—one or the other may apply.  But, 
determination of combatant status by a competent tribunal is a mechanism for determining 
combatant status.  Why, then, does the Act list a competent-tribunal determination of unlawful 
combatancy as a definition of unlawful combatant status?  And what is the purpose of the other—
substantive—definition of “unlawful combatant?”  When the requirement of §948d(b) on 
“Jurisdiction”—that “military commissions shall not have jurisdiction over lawful enemy 
combatants”—is read in conjunction with §948a on “Definitions,”49 the personal jurisdictional 
framework of the MCA becomes clear. 
The two definitions of “unlawful combatant” have distinct functions, relevant at different 
stages of the proceedings.  The substantive definition of “unlawful combatant” (definition (i)) 50 
is to be applied by any entity—competent tribunal, military commission, or appellate court— 
evaluating a detainee’s combatant status.  Definition (ii)—that an “unlawful combatant” is a 
                                                 
48 Id. § 948(a)(1) (emphasis added).  The “Combatant Status Review Tribunals [CSRTs],” referred to in 
§948a(1)(A)(ii) were established in 2004 by order of the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense.  See Paul Wolfowitz, 
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.  In accordance with the terms of that order and 
with the regulations promulgated thereunder, a CSRT determines whether a detainee is an enemy combatant, but not 
whether he is a lawful or an unlawful enemy combatant.  See id. 
The CMCR has ruled that, because the MCA limits military commission jurisdiction to unlawful enemy combatants, 
a CSRT determination of enemy combatancy cannot form the basis for military commission jurisdiction under the 
MCA.  See United States v. Khadr, CMCR Case No. 07-001 (Sep. 24, 2007). 
49Id. §948d(b).   
50 Id. § 948a(1)(A)(i). 
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person who has been so designated by a competent tribunal—is to be applied in making the 
initial determination of the forum (court-martial or military commission) to which a given case 
should be directed.  The determination of unlawful combatant status by a competent tribunal is 
the necessary and sufficient condition for the initial submission of a case to military-commission 
jurisdiction.51  If that status determination has been made, the detainee may be treated as an 
unlawful combatant and, therefore, military commission jurisdiction may attach.  It is in this 
sense that the competent-tribunal determination “defines” “unlawful combatant” for this stage of 
the proceedings.   
The competent-tribunal determination of unlawful combatant status is a necessary 
prerequisite to any exercise of military commission jurisdiction.  Only once a determination of 
unlawful combatant status has been made by a competent tribunal and the presumptive right to 
POW treatment has, thereby, been rebutted, may military commission jurisdiction attach in the 
first instance.   
Other courts, by contrast, routinely exercise jurisdiction to determine their own 
jurisdiction as an initial matter—even while recognizing that the jurisdictional inquiry may result 
in a determination that the court has (and, in some sense, had) no jurisdiction over the case.52  
Military commissions are unlike other courts in this respect because of the presumption of lawful 
combatant status, which excludes potential defendants from military commission jurisdiction 
unless and until that presumption is lawfully rebutted by a competent tribunal.  MCA §948d(b) 
states that, “Military commissions under this chapter shall not have jurisdiction over lawful 
enemy combatants.”53  Rather, it provides, lawful combatants, like members of the US armed 
                                                 
51 Id. § 948a(1)(A)(ii).  
52 See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
53 10 U.S.C. § 948d(b) (emphasis added). 
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forces, shall be subject to court-martial jurisdiction.54  In so providing, the MCA implements 
article 102 of the POW Convention, which provides that persons protected by the Convention 
may be prosecuted only, “by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of 
members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power.”55   
The exclusion from military commission jurisdiction, enunciated in MCA § 948d(b) and 
required by POW Convention article 102, applies, like all POW rights, to any detainee from the 
time he is detained and remains in force unless and until a determination rebutting the 
presumption of POW status is made by an article-5 competent tribunal.  The law is utterly clear 
that all detained combatants shall receive the full protection of the POW Convention “from the 
time they fall into the power of the enemy”56  Article 5 of the Convention states, 
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 
[defining lawful combatants] from the time they fall into the power of the 
enemy and until their final release and repatriation. 
 
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a 
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any 
of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the 
protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal. 
 
The operation of the MCA’s exclusion of lawful combatants from military commission 
jurisdiction (as required by the law of war)—together with the black-letter law requiring that  
POW rights be honored by the detaining state from the beginning of captivity until a contrary 
determination is rendered by an article-5, competent  tribunal determines otherwise—places the 
military commission in a decidedly different position than other courts relative to the initial 
determination of jurisdiction:  A detainee, prior to a competent-tribunal determination of 
unlawful combatant status is a presumptively lawful combatant, entitled to treatment in 
                                                 
54 See id. 
55 POW Convention, art. 102 (emphasis added). 
56 POW Convention, art. 5 (emphasis added). 
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accordance with MCA § 948d(b) and the POW right (article 102) that it implements.  The 
rebuttal of presumptive lawful combatant status by a competent tribunal is, thus, a necessary 
condition for the attachment of military commission jurisdiction. 
The competent-tribunal determination of unlawful combatant status is also a sufficient 
condition for the initial submission of a case to military commission jurisdiction.  That is the 
meaning of the provision, in § 948d(c) on “Jurisdiction,” that, “[a] finding . . . by a . . . 
competent tribunal . . . that a person is an unlawful enemy combatant is dispositive for purposes 
of jurisdiction for trial by military commission.”57  The competent-tribunal finding is 
“dispositive” in that it is a sufficient condition for the initial submission of a case to military-
commission jurisdiction; nothing additional is required to rebut the detainee’s presumptive POW 
status and thereby to establish the initial jurisdiction of a military commission.  That jurisdiction 
may be exercised notwithstanding any pending appeal of the competent tribunal’s determination. 
As stated in the Rules for Military Commissions (RMC): 
A finding . . . by a . . . competent tribunal . . . that a person is an 
unlawful enemy combatant is dispositive for purposes of jurisdiction for trial 
by a military commission under the M.C.A.  The determination by the tribunal 
shall apply for purposes of military commission jurisdiction without regard to 
any pending petitions for review or other appeals.58 
 
It makes perfect sense that Congress provided in the MCA that a competent tribunal 
determination is “dispositive for purposes of jurisdiction for trial by military commission.”59   
The MCA provides, in a separate section, for federal appellate review of certain combatant status 
determinations by competent tribunals.60  To ensure that appellate review of competent tribunal 
                                                 
57 10 U.S.C. § 948d(c) (emphasis added). 
58 Manual for Military Commissions, Part II, Rules for Military Commission [hereinafter RMC], Rule 202(b) 
(2007). 
59 10 U.S.C. §948d(c) (2006). 
60 Section 7(a) of the MCA incorporates section 1005(e)(2)(A) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), which 
provides that: “[T]he United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine the validity of any final decision of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal that an alien is 
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determinations would not delay military commission proceedings, Congress specified that the 
competent tribunal determination shall be dispositive “for purposes of jurisdiction for trial by 
military commission.”61   
The “dispositive” clause does not mean that, at that trial, the military commission is 
prohibited from making a combatant status determination to ascertain its own jurisdiction or to 
rule on a challenge to personal jurisdiction.  It means, rather, that a competent tribunal’s 
determination of unlawful combatant status may form the basis for the initial exercise of military 
commission jurisdiction notwithstanding any pending appeal of the competent tribunal’s 
determination.   
Congress had to identify, in the MCA, the mechanism for making the initial status 
determination that would determine whether a given case would be allocated to a military 
commission or to a court-martial.  Once “jurisdiction for trial by military commission” is 
established as an initial matter through the competent-tribunal determination, the military 
commission may then exercise jurisdiction—in the course of that trial—to review its own 
jurisdiction.  But first the military commission has to have the case. That is why the “dispositive 
clause” reads, “is dispositive for purposes of jurisdiction for trial by military commission” rather 
than, “is dispositive of military commission jurisdiction.”  
The competent tribunal determination is not—and could not be—dispositive of military 
commission jurisdiction in the sense that it would divest the military commission of jurisdiction 
to determine combatant status in order to ascertain its own jurisdiction.  The jurisdiction to 
determine its own jurisdiction has long been recognized as fundamental among the necessary and 
                                                                                                                                                             
properly detained as an enemy combatant.” Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Div. A, tit. 10, 
119 Stat. 2739, §1005(e)(2)(A) (2005). 
61 10 U.S.C. § 948d(c) (2006). 
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inherent powers of a court.62  Indeed, the Rules for Military Commissions make the point 
succinctly, stating:  “A military commission always has jurisdiction to determine whether it has 
jurisdiction.”63 
Once the presumption of lawful combatant status has been rebutted by a competent 
tribunal and military commission jurisdiction has lawfully attached, then—consistent with the 
Article 45(2) right to an adjudication of combatant status for a person who is not held as a POW 
and is to be tried for an offense arising from the hostilities—the military commission may 
adjudicate combatant status to determine its own jurisdiction.  When the commission conducts 
that combatant status adjudication, the substantive definition of “unlawful combatant”64 
(definition (i)) is to be applied.  
In sum, when and only when the presumption of POW status has been lawfully rebutted 
by a competent tribunal may initial military commission jurisdiction attach.  The military 
commission may then, as part of its functions in conducting criminal proceedings, hear motions 
challenging its personal jurisdiction, including challenges based on the assertion of POW 
status.65  In ruling on such motions (or on its own motion), the commission may make a 
combatant status determination in order to determine its own jurisdiction. 66  The MCA’s 
                                                 
62 See United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 291 (1947); Cargill Ferrous Intern. v. SEA PHOENIX MV, 325 
F.3d 695, 704 (5th Cir. 2003) (“A bedrock principle of federal courts is that they have jurisdiction to determine 
jurisdiction.”); Nestor v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“[W]e always have jurisdiction to determine our 
jurisdiction”); United States v. Harmon, 63 M.J. 98, 101 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Melanson, 53 M.J. 1, 2 
(C.A.A.F. 2000).  See also Government’s Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 20, in United States v. Khadr, C.M.C.R. 
07-001 (2007).   
63 RMC § 201(b)(3).  This RMC assumes that the threshold requirements for initial military commission 
jurisdiction have been met.  A commission could not, for example, exercise jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction 
over a non-alien or a person against whom there were no charges—or over a presumptively lawful combatant. 
64 Id. § 948a(1)(A)(i). 
65 See id.; 10 U.S.C. § 948d(c). 
66 RMC § 907(b)(1)(A). 
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substantive definition of unlawful combatant status67 (definition (i)) is to be applied by the 
military commission in that adjudication.   
Interpreted in the way suggested here, the MCA’s jurisdictional regime, which might 
otherwise seem to pose a conundrum, is perfectly logical and legally sound.  A finding of 
unlawful combatancy by a competent tribunal is a prerequisite to the attachment of military 
commission jurisdiction.  That finding is dispositive for establishing that initial jurisdiction.  A 
military commission, once lawfully seized of a case, may adjudicate combatant status to confirm 
or disconfirm its own jurisdiction.  There is no contradiction between these two prongs of the 
jurisdictional regime established by the MCA.   
That two-tiered jurisdictional structure established by the MCA is consistent with—
indeed, as we have seen, is precisely what is required by—the law of war.   Consistent with the 
legal presumption of lawful combatant status embodied in Article 5 of the POW Convention and 
Article 45(1) of Protocol I, a competent tribunal determination of unlawful combatant status is 
prerequisite to the attachment of military commission jurisdiction.  And, as required by Article 
45(2), a detainee, held as a non-POW, who is to be tried for an offense arising out of the 
hostilities, receives a de novo, judicial adjudication of status—by the military commission—if he 
asserts POW status.  The MCA, thus interpreted, is internally consistent and fully in keeping 
with the two-tiered status determination system required by the law of war.   
Fundamental canons of statutory interpretation require that the MCA be so interpreted.  
The Supreme Court stated in the Charming Betsy case that, “An act of Congress ought never to 
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”68  The 
Court has reiterated repeatedly, in the two centuries since deciding Charming Betsy, that 
                                                 
67 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(A)(i), 
68 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
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statutory ambiguity should be resolved consistently with international law, when that is 
possible.69   There is indeed ambiguity in the wording of the MCA’s provisions on personal 
jurisdiction.  And that ambiguity is readily resolved in a manner consistent with the international 
law of war.  Not only is this construction of the MCA required by the Charming Betsy canon but, 
as will be discussed shortly, the alternative interpretations lead to untenable results. 
IV.  The Jurisdictional Rulings of the Guantanamo Military Commissions and 
the Court of Military Commissions Review 
 
The interpretation of the MCA’s jurisdictional framework remains highly contested.  The 
jurisdictional rulings to date, in addition to varying between cases, have tended to be internally 
inconsistent, and inconsistent with both the MCA and the law of war. 
A.  Litigating Jurisdiction in U.S. v. Khadr 
On June 4, 2007, the Guantanamo military commission presided over by military judge 
Peter Brownback convened for the arraignment of detainee Omar Khadr.  Acting on his own 
motion, Judge Brownback dismissed Khadr’s charges for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Judge 
Brownback’s remarkable ruling warrants reproduction in full.  He ruled as follows: 
1. A military commission is a court of limited jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is set 
by statute—the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).  
 
2. Section 948d establishes the jurisdiction of a military commission. 948d(a) 
states:  
(a) JURISDICTION.—A military commission under this chapter shall have 
jurisdiction to try any offense made punishable by this chapter . . . when 
committed by an alien unlawful enemy combatant.  
 
3. Section 948d(b) specifically states that military commissions “shall not have 
jurisdiction over lawful enemy combatants.”  
 
4. Thus, in the MCA, Congress denominates for the purpose of establishing 
jurisdiction two categories of enemy combatants – lawful and unlawful. A 
military commission only has jurisdiction to try an unlawful enemy combatant.  
                                                 
69 See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004); McCulloch v. Sociedad 
Nacional de Marinos de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953).   
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5. Further, in Section 948d(c), Congress stated that a finding by a Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) [or other competent tribunal] that a person is an 
unlawful enemy combatant is dispositive for purposes of jurisdiction by military 
commissions.  
 
6. In considering Section 948d, it is clear that the MCA contemplates a two-part 
system. First, it anticipates that there shall be an administrative decision by the 
CSRT [or other competent tribunal] which will establish the status of a person 
for purposes of the MCA. The CSRT [or other competent tribunal] can find, for 
MCA purposes, that a person is a lawful enemy combatant or an unlawful 
enemy combatant.  
 
7. Second, once the CSRT [or other competent tribunal] finds that a person is an 
unlawful enemy combatant, the provisions of the MCA come into play. Such 
person may have charges sworn against him, those charges may be referred to a 
military commission for trial, and a military commission may try him. A strict 
reading of the MCA would appear to require that, until such time as a CSRT (or 
other competent tribunal) makes a finding that a person is an unlawful enemy 
combatant, the provisions of the MCA do not come into play and such person 
may not be charged, charges may not be referred to a military commission for 
trial, and the military commission has no jurisdiction to try him.  
  
8. There is, of course, the counter-argument. The military commission itself is a 
competent tribunal (948d(c)) to determine if a person brought before it is an 
unlawful enemy combatant. While appealing, this argument has two major 
flaws:  
a. First, in order to make the determination, the military judge would 
have to conduct a mini-trial to decide if the person is an unlawful enemy 
combatant. Or would s/he? Perhaps, since this determination might require 
factual determinations, the panel would have to make it. Congress provided in 
the MCA for many scenarios – none anticipated that the military commission 
would make the lawful/unlawful enemy combatant determination.  
b. Second, a person has a right to be tried only by a court which he 
knows has jurisdiction over him. If the military commission were to make the 
determination, a person could be facing trial for months, without knowing if the 
court, in fact and in law, had jurisdiction.  
 
9. Persons familiar with the court-martial system might state that jurisdiction is 
always assumed by the court-martial and it is attacked only by motion. That is 
true, but a court-martial is a different creature than a military commission. A 
soldier is in court in uniform with her first sergeant and company commander 
(who most likely preferred the charges) sitting in the courtroom. DD Form 458, 
the Charge Sheet, contains the following information in Block I – Personal 
Data: Name of accused, SSN, Grade or Rank, Pay Grade, Unit or Organization, 
Initial Date and Term of Current Service, Pay Per Month, Nature of Restraint of 
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Accused, and Date(s) Imposed. So when a military judge at Fort Bragg looks at 
the Charge Sheet and the accused (Who is in uniform.), she knows that Private 
First Class William B. Jones is a member of Bravo Company, 3rd 
 
Battalion 
(Airborne), 325th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina. She knows how much he is being paid, if he has been 
restrained, when he came on active duty this tour, and by comparing the unit to 
the name of the accuser in Block III – Preferral – she can see if it was PFC 
Jones’ company commander who preferred the charges.  
 
10. Contrast this with the information on MC Form 458 in this case. The 
military judge is told that the name of the accused is Omar Ahmed Khadr. Three 
aliases are given. And, the last four of an unidentified acronym, the ISN, are 
given. There is nothing on the face of the charge sheet to establish or support 
jurisdiction over Mr. Khadr, except for a bare allegation in the wording of the 
Specifications of the Charges  
 
11. The military judge is not ruling that no facts could be properly established 
concerning Mr. Khadr which might fit the definition of an unlawful enemy 
combatant in Section 948a(a) of the MCA. The military judge is ruling that the 
military commission is not the proper authority, under the provisions of the 
MCA, to determine that Mr. Khadr is an unlawful enemy combatant in order to 
establish initial jurisdiction for this commission to try Mr. Khadr.  
  
12. The military judge is not ruling that Mr. Khadr may not, if his case is 
referred to trial after a proper determination, attack those facts in the elements of 
the offenses referred which might combine to show him to be an unlawful 
enemy combatant. Such an attack is a proper part of a military commission.  
 
13. The military judge is not ruling that the charges against Mr. Khadr must be 
resworn. That would seem to be the more prudent avenue to take, but that issue 
is not currently before this commission.  
 
14. If there were no two-step process required to try a person under the MCA, 
then a prosecutor could swear charges, the convening authority could refer 
charges, and a military commission could try a person who had had no 
determination as to his status whatsoever. That is not what Congress intended to 
establish in the MCA.  
 
16. The charges are dismissed without prejudice.  
 
Peter E. Brownback III  
COL, JA, USA  
Military Judge 
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 Judge Brownback’s lucid ruling is consistent with the law of war and with a proper 
interpretation of the MCA.  It does not, though, fully explicate its reasons or its connections to 
those sources of law. 
In response to Judge Brownback’s dismissal of the charges against Khadr, the 
Government moved for reconsideration.  When Judge Brownback denied that motion, the 
Government appealed Judge Brownback’s decision to the CMCR. 
 On September 24, 2007, the CMCR issued its opinion—the first issued by that court—
overturning in part and upholding in part Judge Brownback’s ruling.70  The CMCR affirmed the 
portion of Judge Brownback’s ruling holding that a determination of “enemy combatant status” 
is not equivalent to a determination of “unlawful enemy combatant status” and, so, cannot suffice 
as a basis for military commission jurisdiction under the MCA.71   
The CMCR reversed the portion of Judge Brownback’s ruling holding that a military 
commission may not exercise jurisdiction absent a prior finding of unlawful combatant status by 
a competent tribunal.72  The CMCR opined that Judge Brownback had erred “in concluding that 
a [competent tribunal] determination of ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ status was a prerequisite to 
referral of charges to a military commission and [in concluding] that . . . he [Judge Brownback] 
lacked authority under the MCA to determine whether Mr. Khadr is an ‘unlawful enemy 
combatant’ for purposes of establishing the military commission’s initial jurisdiction to try 
him.”73 
 
 
                                                 
70 United States v. Khadr, CMCR Case No. 07-001 (Sep. 24, 2007). 
71 Id., at 16.   
For explanation of the CSRT-related matter that the CMCR upheld, see supra note 44.   
72 Id. at 18. 
73 Id. at 18-20. 
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The relevant portion of the CMCR opinion is as follows: 
In our opinion, the M.C.A. is clear and deliberate in its creation of a bifurcated 
methodology for establishing an accused’s “unlawful enemy combatant” status 
so as to permit that individual’s trial before a military commission. These two 
methods are laid out in M.C.A. § 948a(1)A where an “unlawful enemy 
combatant” is defined as:  
 
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and 
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents 
who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the 
Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or  
 
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy 
combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent 
tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of 
Defense.  
 
The disjunctive “or” between subsections (i) and (ii) clearly sets forth 
alternative approaches for establishing military commission jurisdiction. The 
military judge did not apply the disjunctive separation of these two provisions, 
and erroneously interpreted the distinct provisions as if written in the 
conjunctive; that is, as if joined by the word “and” rather than “or.” Such an 
interpretation would render subsection (i) nothing more than a definition in aid 
of a C.S.R.T. (or other competent tribunal) determination of combatant status 
under subsection (ii), and is contradictory to the statute’s clear structure, 
wording, and overall intent.  
 
Upon challenge, the first method by which the M.C.A. contemplates jurisdiction 
being established is by evidence being presented before the military judge 
factually establishing that an accused meets the definition of “unlawful enemy 
combatant” as contained in subsection (i). . . .  There is a long and well-
developed tradition in US federal courts and, specifically, throughout military 
court-martial jurisprudence of military judges deciding matters of personal 
jurisdiction.  Congress . . . would not have deprived military commissions of the 
ability to independently decide personal jurisdiction absent an express statement 
of such intent. No such statement is contained anywhere in the M.C.A.  
 
The military judge’s reliance on M.C.A. § 948a(1)(A)(ii) for the proposition that 
a military commission itself cannot determine personal jurisdiction is misplaced. 
This provision supports Appellant’s position rather than detracts from it. 
Although Congress assigned a jurisdictional “safe harbor” for prior C.S.R.T. (or 
other competent tribunal) determinations of “unlawful enemy combatant” status 
by statutorily deeming them “dispositive” of jurisdiction, it did not in any way 
preclude Appellant from proving jurisdiction before the military commission in 
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the absence of such a determination. Indeed, the existence of a statutorily 
recognized path to achieve a “dispositive” determination of jurisdiction suggests 
that pretrial procedures and pleadings alleging jurisdiction should simply be 
viewed as “nondispositive.” Subsection (ii) does not eliminate traditional 
methods of proving jurisdiction before the commission itself. We agree with 
Appellant’s suggestion that Congress, through subsection (ii), merely carved out 
an exception to the military commission’s authority to itself determine 
jurisdictional matters. As Appellant notes, subsection (ii) makes it clear that the 
military judge is not at liberty to revisit a C.S.R.T.’s (or other competent 
tribunal’s) finding of “unlawful enemy combatant” status when there is such a 
finding. However, nothing in the M.C.A. requires such a finding in order to 
establish military commission jurisdiction. Had they so intended, Congress 
could have clearly stated in the M.C.A. that the only way to establish military 
commission jurisdiction is through a prior C.S.R.T. (or other competent 
tribunal) determination of “unlawful enemy combatant” status. It did not. 
Accordingly, we may properly find -- as clearly indicated in the language of 
M.C.A. §§ 949a(a) and 948b(c) -- that Congress intended for military 
commissions to “apply the principles of law” and “the procedures for trial 
[routinely utilized] by general courts-martial . . . .” This would include the 
common procedures used before general courts-martial permitting military 
judges to hear evidence and decide factual and legal matters concerning the 
court’s own jurisdiction over the accused appearing before it.  
 
This view is supported in the Rules for Military Commissions, which provide 
exactly such procedures. . . . Clearly, these rules contemplate potential litigation 
of personal jurisdictional issues by the military commission, and provide the 
procedures necessary to address such a challenge. If the only avenue to achieve 
military commission jurisdiction was through a previously rendered C.S.R.T. (or 
other competent tribunal) determination of “unlawful enemy combatant” status, 
all of these rules would be superfluous, as “dispositive” jurisdiction would have 
attached before the fact. 
  
The text, structure, and history of the M.C.A. demonstrate clearly that a military 
judge presiding over a military commission may determine both the factual 
issue of an accused’s “unlawful enemy combatant status” and the corresponding 
legal issue of the military commission’s in personam jurisdiction. A contrary 
interpretation would ignore the bifurcated structure of M.C.A. § 948(1)(A) and 
the long-standing history of military judges in general courts-martial finding 
jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence, and resolving pretrial 
motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The M.C.A. identifies two potential 
jurisdiction-establishing methodologies based upon an allegation of “unlawful 
enemy combatant” status. The first, reflected in § 948a(1)(A)(i), involves the 
clear delineation of the jurisdictional standard to be applied by a military 
commission in determining its own jurisdiction. The second, contained in § 
948a(1)(A)(ii), involves a non-judicial related jurisdictional determination that 
is to be afforded “dispositive” deference by the military commission. Either 
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method will allow the military commission’s exercise of jurisdiction where 
“unlawful enemy combatant” status has been established by a preponderance of 
the evidence. This interpretation is consistent with the requirements of both the 
M.C.A. and with international law. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (acts of Congress will generally be construed in 
a manner so as not to violate international law, as we presume that Congress 
ordinarily seeks to comply with international law when legislating).74  
 
The CMCR opinion, as is demonstrated below, interprets the MCA inconsistently with 
the law of war.  In so doing, it fails to fulfill the Charming Betsy canon—that an ambiguous 
provision in a statute should be interpreted consistently with international law, if possible.  The 
opinion, by interpreting the MCA to limit the jurisdiction of military commissions to determine 
their own jurisdiction, also poses a significant problems concerning core principles of judicial 
jurisdiction.  These two areas of difficulty are examined below, after a brief consideration of the 
set of logically-possible interpretations of the MCA that were available to the CMCR.   
While the CMCR reached what it viewed as the best available outcome in Khadr, the 
court expresses discomfort at several points in the opinion with the conclusions it reaches—or, at 
least, notes drawbacks in those conclusions and their ramifications.  Certain available 
interpretations of the MCA’s jurisdictional framework are not considered in the CMCR opinion 
and, perhaps, were not apparent to the CMCR as it reached its decision.  Those options are 
identified and evaluated below.  
In examining the interpretations of the MCA that were available to the CMCR, recall that 
the MCA’s “Jurisdiction” section, as noted earlier, states:  “A finding . . . by a . . . competent 
tribunal . . . that a person is an unlawful enemy combatant is dispositive for purposes of 
jurisdiction for trial by military commission. . . .”75 
Recall, also, that the Act’s “Definitions” section provides that: 
                                                 
74 Id. at 21–25 (some internal citations omitted). 
75 § 948d(b). 
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(1)(A) The term ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ means— 
‘‘(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and 
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-
belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person 
who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces);  
or 
‘‘(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful 
enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another 
competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the 
Secretary of Defense.76 
 
Those provisions are facially ambiguous on two questions:  Is a competent tribunal 
determination of unlawful combatancy a prerequisite to initial military commission jurisdiction?  
And, does a competent tribunal determination of unlawful combatancy (“dispositive” under § 
948d(c)) preempt determination of combatant status by a military commission?  The possible 
answers to those questions create four logical possibilities for interpreting the MCA.  The Table 
below presents those four possible interpretations. 
                                                 
76  § 948(a)(1). 
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POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF MCA PROVISIONS ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
 
 
            Competent Tribunal  
   Determination Preempts Status               Does Not Preempt 
         Determination by M.C.*             
 
 
 
 
Competent Tribunal 
Determination Is Not 
Prerequisite to M.C. 
Jurisdiction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is Prerequisite  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
* “M.C.” indicates Military Commission. 
 
1)  
Violates MCA and law of war 
by permitting the attachment 
of M.C. jurisdiction to a 
presumptively lawful 
combatant;   
violates Article 45(2) by 
denying a judicial status 
adjudication to a detainee who 
is held as a non-POW and is to 
be tried for an offense arising 
out of the hostilities; and, 
strips military commissions of 
courts’ inherent power to 
determine their own 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
2) 
Renders meaningless the 
MCA’s provisions on 
competent tribunals. 
 
3)  
Violates Article 45(2) by 
denying a judicial status 
adjudication to a detainee who 
is held as a non-POW and is to 
be tried for an offense arising 
out of the hostilities; and, 
strips military commissions of 
courts’ inherent power to 
determine their own 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4) 
Fulfills the requirements of the 
MCA and the law of war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34
 
The interpretation represented in Cell 1 is that, under the MCA, a combatant status 
determination by a competent tribunal is not a prerequisite to military commission jurisdiction, 
and a military commission may not make a combatant status determination to ascertain its own 
jurisdiction if a determination of unlawful combatant status has been made by a competent 
tribunal.  This interpretation would lead, in any given case, to one of two unlawful results.  In a 
case where there was no competent-tribunal determination of unlawful combatant status, a 
presumptively lawful combatant would nevertheless be subject to military commission 
jurisdiction.  In a case where there was a competent-tribunal determination of unlawful 
combatant status, a person who was held as a non-POW and was to be tried for an offense arising 
out of the hostilities would be denied the Article 45(2) right to a judicial adjudication of status.  
The interpretation presented in Cell 1 also would strip military commissions of the jurisdiction to 
determine their own jurisdiction, a problem to be discussed further, below. 
 The interpretation represented in Cell 2 is that a status determination by a competent 
tribunal is not a prerequisite to military commission jurisdiction, and a military commission may 
make a combatant status determination, to ascertain its own jurisdiction, even if a competent 
tribunal had previously made a determination of unlawful combatant status.  This, obviously, is 
not what Congress intended.  If a competent tribunal determination is not a prerequisite to 
military commission jurisdiction and a military commission may make its own combatant status 
determination notwithstanding a prior determination by a competent tribunal, then the entire 
reference in the MCA to competent tribunal determinations is superfluous.  Under the 
interpretation represented in Cell 2, the determination of combatant status by a competent 
tribunal makes absolutely no difference:  with or without a competent-tribunal determination, a 
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military commission may exercise initial jurisdiction and may make a combatant status 
determination in order to ascertain its own jurisdiction. 
The interpretation represented in Cell 3 is that a status determination by a competent 
tribunal is a prerequisite to military commission jurisdiction, and a military commission may not 
make a combatant status determination to ascertain its own jurisdiction if a determination of 
unlawful combatant status has been made by a competent tribunal.  Here, consistent with the law 
of war, a detainee is excluded from military commission jurisdiction absent a prior determination 
of unlawful combatant status by a competent tribunal.  But, in violation of the law of war, a 
detainee held as a non-POW, who is to be tried for an offense arising out of the hostilities, is 
denied an Article 45(2) de novo adjudication of combatant status.  The interpretation represented 
in Cell 3 also strips military commissions of the jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction, 
as discussed further, below. 
The interpretation represented in Cell 4 is that a status determination by a competent 
tribunal is a prerequisite to military commission jurisdiction, and a military commission may 
make a combatant status determination to ascertain its own jurisdiction.  This interpretation 
offers a solution to the conundrum of jurisdiction under the MCA.  It is the interpretation 
discussed at length in Part III, above.  This interpretation of personal jurisdiction under the MCA 
is consistent with the law of war, consistent with the MCA read as a whole, and retains for 
military commissions the jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.  As is sketched out in 
the foregoing paragraphs, and discussed at greater length below, the alternative interpretations 
lead inevitably to a thicket of difficulties. 
 The CMCR, in the Khadr ruling, selects the interpretation of the MCA represented in 
Cell 1, holding that a competent-tribunal determination of unlawful combatant status is not a 
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prerequisite to military commission jurisdiction,77 and that such a determination, if one has been 
made, preempts determination of combatant status by a military commission.78  That 
interpretation of the MCA commits the court to violations of the law of war, violations of the 
MCA, and impingements on the traditional jurisdictional powers of courts.   
1.  International Law 
The CMCR’s ruling entails several violations of the international law of war.  First, by 
permitting the exercise of military commission jurisdiction in the absence of a competent-
tribunal determination of unlawful combatancy, the ruling violates the presumption of lawful 
combatant status embodied in Articles 5 and 45.79  The MCA provides that military commissions 
shall not have jurisdiction over lawful combatants.  The law of war provides that a combatant 
held by the enemy is presumed to be a lawful combatant unless a contrary determination is made 
by a competent tribunal.  By holding that military commission jurisdiction may attach to a 
detainee in the absence of a prior competent-tribunal determination of unlawful combatant status, 
the CMCR treats a presumptively lawful combatant as an unlawful combatant, in violation of the 
                                                 
77 Khadr at 18. 
78 Id. at 24-25. 
Under the court’s interpretation, the MCA contemplates two methods for determining combatant status, 
either (but not both) of which may be applied in any given case:  a competent-tribunal may determine combatant 
status or, in lieu of that, a military-commission may do so.  The court does not account for what would be, under that 
interpretation, a curious feature of the MCA:  Why, if there are two methods for determining combatant status—
before a competent tribunal and before a military commission—is only one method mentioned in the “Jurisdiction” 
section?  If combatant status determinations by competent tribunals and military commissions were simply two, 
alternative methods for determining military-commission jurisdiction, then why would the “Jurisdiction” section 
account for only one of them?   
When the competent-tribunal status determination and the military-commission status adjudication are 
understood as the sequenced steps in the two-tiered system of status determination required by the law of war 
(specifically Article 45(2) of Protocol I), the mystery disappears:  Congress needed to identify the method for 
determining a prior the jurisdiction—military commission or court-martial—to which a case should be submitted.  
Whichever jurisdiction received a particular case could then adjudicate combatant status to review its own 
jurisdiction, if that became appropriate, in the course of the litigation.  But first, the case had to be sent to one court 
or the other.  The MCA’s “Jurisdiction” section states the method for making that initial decision. 
79 Cite. 
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law of war.  By eroding the presumption of lawful combatant status, the opinion places in 
jeopardy that threshold safeguard for all POW rights and protections. 
The CMCR, of course, should never have been faced with the question whether a 
competent-tribunal status determination is prerequisite to the exercise of military commission 
jurisdiction over Khadr.  A detained combatant is entitled to the presumption of lawful 
combatancy—and, hence, POW status—from the time he is brought into captivity until such time 
as that presumption is rebutted by a finding of unlawful combatancy by a competent tribunal.80  
Omar Khadr was brought to Guantanamo in 2002.  Like all the detainees at Guantanamo, he has 
been held, since the time of his capture, as a non-POW but has never had a competent-tribunal 
status determination.  That systematic violation of the law of war, however, is beyond the scope 
of the present article.   
The second major aspect of the CMCR ruling—that a combatant status determination by 
a competent tribunal, if one has been made, preempts adjudication of combatant status by a 
military commission – entails another violation of the law of war.  The opinion explicitly 
acknowledges that Article 45(2) of Protocol I embodies customary international law.81  The court 
notes that, 
Article 45(2) of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions[] suggests that a 
detained individual who is not being held as a POW has the right to assert an 
entitlement to POW status before a judicial tribunal, and that judicial 
adjudication of combatant status shall occur before trial for any alleged 
substantive offense. 82 
 
The opinion then asserts that its interpretation of the MCA is consistent with Article 45(2), 
stating: 
                                                 
80 See Art. 5; Art. 45(1). 
81 Khadr at 25, n. 38.  
82 Id.  
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Following the M.C.A. procedures, as we interpret them here, would allow an 
accused to assert a claim of POW (i.e., lawful combatant) status at a pretrial 
motion session before the military judge. This pretrial determination of status 
would be fully in accord with Article 45(2) of Protocol I.83 
 
But, as noted above, the opinion states elsewhere that, “[T]he military judge is not at 
liberty to revisit a . . . competent tribunal’s [] finding of ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ status when 
there is such a finding.”84  The CMCR cannot have it both ways.  In holding that a military 
commission may not adjudicate combatant status when there has been a prior determination of 
unlawful combatant status by a competent tribunal, the ruling directly violates Article 45(2), 
even while purporting to enforce it. 
The CMCR opinion does not identify or address this problem.  Rather, the opinion asserts 
simply that the MCA, in prohibiting a military commission from ‘revisiting’ a competent 
tribunal’s finding of unlawful combatant status, “has merely carved out an exception to the 
military commission’s authority to determine jurisdictional matters.”85  But, if the CMCR 
interprets the MCA to require this “exception” to the requirements of Article 45(2), then the 
CMCR can hardly maintain, as it does, that “[t]his interpretation is consistent with the 
requirements of both the M.C.A. and with international law.”86   
The CMCR’s holding that a competent tribunal determination preempts adjudication of 
status by a military commission leads to another infelicitous result as well.  The CMCR correctly 
states that Article 45(2) requires that an individual who is not held as a POW is entitled, if he is 
to be prosecuted for an offense arising out of the hostilities, “to assert his right to prisoner-of-war 
status before a judicial tribunal and to have that question adjudicated.”87  It stands to reason that 
                                                 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 21 (emphasis in original). 
85 Id. at 23. 
86 Id. at 25. 
87 Khadr at 25, n. 38; Protocol I, art. 45(2). 
 39
the Article 45(2) entitlement to a status adjudication applies only to a detainee who is not held as 
a POW.  There would be no logic in affording a status adjudication to a detainee already held as 
a POW and whose POW trial rights were, therefore, not at issue.  But, in holding that a 
competent-tribunal determination of unlawful combatancy preempts a status adjudication by a 
military commission, the court specifically denies an Article 45(2) adjudication of status to every 
person who lawfully could be “not held as a POW.”  The result is absurd: only a detainee who 
has been determined by a competent tribunal to be an unlawful combatant is entitled to, or has 
any need for, a status adjudication under Article 45(2); but the CMCR’s interpretation of the 
MCA denies a status adjudication to precisely that group of detainees.  
Under the CMCR ruling, then, a detainee gets either a status determination by a 
competent tribunal or an Article 45(2) adjudication.  If he has already had the former, he is 
ineligible for the latter, and vice versa.  But, under the law of war, it is only if he has had the 
former that he has any need for the latter—and he is entitled to both.  By denying each defendant 
either the competent tribunal determination to which he is entitled under Articles 5 and 45(1) or 
the judicial adjudication of status to which he is entitled under Article 45(2), the CMCR ruling 
generates a law-of-war violation every time that a military commission exercises jurisdiction. 
The violations of the law of war that are entailed in the CMCR opinion are fundamental.  
Without so stating, the CMCR opinion does away with the presumption of lawful combatancy, 
the role of the competent tribunal as the sole means for rebutting that presumption, and the 
Article 45(2) right to a judicial adjudication of combatant status.  If this ruling is permitted to 
stand, the damage to POW protections will be far-reaching. 
2. The Inherent Jurisdiction of Courts 
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The interpretation of the MCA adopted by the CMCR abrogates the traditional power of 
courts to determine their own jurisdiction.  Under the MCA, the CMCR says, a military 
commission is prohibited from adjudicating combatant status if a combatant status determination 
has been made by a competent tribunal.  This, the CMCR suggests, is the meaning of the 
“dispositive” clause in the MCA’s “Jurisdiction” section. 88  The difficulties posed as a 
consequence of that interpretation go to fundamental principles of the inherent jurisdiction of 
courts.   
Would a military commission, presented with new evidence proving the lawful 
combatant status of the accused, be required nevertheless to treat as “dispositive” the status 
determination made by the competent tribunal and, so, proceed with the trial of a demonstrably 
lawful combatant over whom it lacked lawful jurisdiction?  Could a commission, deprived of the 
“inherent jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction,” fulfill the requirement articulated in the 
MCA and in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, that a military commission be a 
“regularly constituted court?”89  The CMCR itself poses the related question whether such an 
arrangement would “deprive[] a military commission accused of a critical ‘judicial guarantee[] . . 
.  recognized as indispensable by civilized people’ under Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
                                                 
88 MCA section 948(d)(c) reads: 
DETERMINATION OF UNLAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANT STATUS DISPOSITIVE –  
A finding, whether before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 
by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of 
the President or the Secretary of Defense that a person is an unlawful enemy combatant is dispositive for 
purposes of jurisdiction for trial by military commission under this chapter. 
89 MCA section 948(b)(f) reads:  
STATUS OF COMMISSIONS UNDER COMMON ARTICLE 3.— 
A military commission established under this chapter is a regularly constituted court, affording all 
the necessary ‘judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples’ for 
purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 
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Conventions (i.e., the right to affirmatively challenge the commission’s in personam jurisdiction 
over him).”90 
The CMCR is not heedless of the role of jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction in the 
basic functioning of courts.  Although it holds that the MCA “carves out an exception” that 
preempts status adjudication by a military commission if a competent tribunal has made a prior 
status determination, the CMCR—in holding that a competent tribunal determination is not a 
prerequisite to military commission jurisdiction—argues forcefully against interpreting the 
MCA to prohibit military commissions from adjudicating status to determine their own 
jurisdiction.  The court observes: 
[T]he M.C.A. contemplates jurisdiction being established . . . by evidence being 
presented before the military judge factually establishing that an accused meets 
the definition of “unlawful enemy combatant” as contained in subsection (i). . . .  
There is a long and well-developed tradition in US federal courts and, 
specifically, throughout military court-martial jurisprudence of military judges 
deciding matters of personal jurisdiction.  Congress . . . would not have deprived 
military commissions of the ability to independently decide personal jurisdiction 
absent an express statement of such intent. No such statement is contained 
anywhere in the M.C.A. . . . .  
Congress intended for military commissions to “apply the principles of 
law” and “the procedures for trial [routinely utilized] by general courts-martial . . 
. .” This would include the common procedures used before general courts-
martial permitting military judges to hear evidence and decide factual and legal 
matters concerning the court’s own jurisdiction over the accused appearing before 
it. 
This view is supported in the Rules for Military Commissions, which 
provide exactly such procedures. . . . Clearly, these rules contemplate potential 
litigation of personal jurisdictional issues by the military commission, and 
provide the procedures necessary to address such a challenge. 
 
The ruling nevertheless, as we know, interprets the MCA to make an “exception” that 
does “deprive[] military commissions of the ability to independently decide personal 
jurisdiction” if a competent tribunal status determination  has been made.  Even while 
announcing that “exception,” though, the CMCR expresses discomfort with the arrangement 
                                                 
90 Khadr at 12, n.18. 
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(questioning, for example, whether thus precluding a challenge to personal jurisdiction before a 
military commission would infringe fundamental judicial guarantees under the law of war).91  
The opinion even flirts, at one point, with the suggestion that the word “dispositive” in the MCA 
should not be understood really to mean dispositive, saying, “Congress intended that properly 
made . . . [competent tribunal] determinations of ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ status . . . should 
be afforded great deference by the military commission.”92   
But, as we have seen, a move in that direction does not offer a solution.  If a competent-
tribunal determination were not a prerequisite to military commission jurisdiction and a military 
commission could make its own combatant status determination (with whatever degree of 
“deference”), then—as represented in Cell 2 in the Table above—the competent tribunal 
determination would be meaningless; with or without a competent-tribunal determination, a 
military commission would be authorized to exercise initial jurisdiction and to adjudicate 
combatant status.93  Under that interpretation, the most that could be said about a competent 
tribunal determination is that, if one happens to exist, it should be taken into account by the 
military commission when it determines its jurisdiction.  
In its 2007 ruling in U.S. v. Khadr, the CMCR has adopted an extremely problematic 
interpretation of the MCA—with which, it seems, the court itself is not entirely comfortable.  
Perhaps the court did not consider—and, in any event, it did not adopt—a far less problematic, 
alternative interpretation that was, and remains, available to it. 94   
                                                 
91 See text accompanying note 58. 
92 United States v. Khadr, CMCR Case No. 07-001, at 12 n.18 (emphasis added). 
93 See supra pp. 27-31. 
94 Madeline Morris, Frank Fountain, Allison Hester-Haddad, Steven Bornick, and Landon Zimmer filed an amicus 
brief with the CMCR in the Khadr case delineating an early version of the interpretation represented in Cell 4.  See 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURAIE (ARTICLE 45 OF PROTOCOL I TO GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006) in U.S. v. Khadr, CMCR Case. No. 07-001 (2007) available at:  
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2007/13Khadr%20Amicus%20Brief%20(Aug%2021)%20(27%20pages).pdf.    
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B. Litigating Jurisdiction in U.S. v. Hamdan 
The difficulties entailed in the CMCR’s Khadr opinion are regenerated in the December 
17, 2007 ruling in U.S. v. Hamdan, the first jurisdictional ruling by a military commission 
seeking to apply the Khadr precedent.  The December 17 ruling also has a very perplexing 
feature:  it is flatly inaccurate in both its quotation and its citation of sources.  
On the same day as Omar Khadr’s charges were dismissed for lack of personal 
jurisdiction by Judge Brownback, Judge Keith Allred dismissed, for lack of personal jurisdiction, 
the charges against Salim Hamdan—the only other military commission defendant then 
charged.95  The Government moved for reconsideration.  Judge Allred granted the govenrment’s 
motion shortly after the CMCR issued its decision in Khadr.  Hamdan, thereupon, submitted a 
motion challenging the personal jurisdiction of the military commission and requesting an 
Article 5 status determination by a competent tribunal.  Hamdan’s motion requesting an Article 5 
status determination made no mention of Article 45; and it made no mention of the requirement, 
discussed earlier,96 that a competent tribunal be composed of more than one person.   
On December 5, 2007, Judge Allred heard oral argument on the motion for an Article 5 
competent-tribunal determination of combatant status.  And, on December 6, he conducted an 
evidentiary hearing on Hamdan’s combatant status.  The evidentiary hearing was held in order 
that, if he decided to grant the motion for an Article 5 status determination by a competent 
tribunal—and if he decided, further, that he himself could serve as that competent tribunal—he 
would be prepared to render the combatant status determination forthwith.   
                                                 
95 See United States v. Hamdan, Order on Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Allred, J.), MCOO # 07-04, 
(June 4, 2007), at http://www.nimj.com/documents/Hamdan%20Order.pdf.  
96 See supra at 6-7. 
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Judge Allred ruled on Hamdan’s motion for an Article 5 status determination on 
December 17, 2007.97  (The ruling is reproduced in full at Appendix A, below.)  The ruling, 
ostensibly granting the motion for an Article 5 tribunal, states that Judge Allred will conduct a 
hearing “to determine whether the accused is an alien unlawful enemy combatant, and therefore 
subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction,”98 and that the same, single hearing “will also 
determine his status for the purposes of Article 5.”99  That outcome violates the law of war and, 
in turn, the Charming Betsy canon.   
The holding, moreover, appears to rest, ultimately, on a purported waiver of certain rights 
afforded under the POW Convention.100  POW rights are not waivable.  For the commission to 
give legal effect to such a purported waiver is a violation of the law of war. 
But there is an additional and more perplexing problem in the December 17 Hamdan 
ruling.  The ruling misstates both the meaning and the actual text of the authorities on which it 
relies.   
Article 5, recall, provides for the presumption of POW rights and for a combatant status 
determination by a competent tribunal in case of doubt.  Article 45 of Protocol I, in paragraph 1, 
reiterates the presumption of POW status and the right to a competent tribunal determination 
and, in paragraph 2, articulates the right to a judicial adjudication of combatant status for a 
detainee not held as a POW who is to be tried for crimes arising out of the hostilities. 
The December 17 Hamdan ruling moves toward its conclusion—that an Article 5 
competent-tribunal proceeding and an Article 45(2) status adjudication will be collapsed into one 
                                                 
97 United States v. Hamdan, Ruling on Defense Motion for Article 5 Status Determination (Allred, J.), (Dec. 17, 
2007), also available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2007/HAMDAN%20ARTICLE%205%20RULING% 
2017%20Dec%202007.pdf. 
98 Id. at 4.  
99 Id.  
100 See infra pp. 4-13. 
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proceeding, conducted by Judge Allred—by a progressive blurring of the distinction between 
Article 5 and Article 45.   
After quoting Article 5 in full, the ruling presents an inaccurate quotation that is 
purported to support the proposition that the Article 5 and Article 45 proceedings may be 
collapsed into one proceeding.  The actual text of the source “quoted,” in fact, decisively rejects 
that proposition.   
The misquoted materials are drawn from Howard S. Levie’s Code of International Armed 
Conflict.101  It is the sole secondary source relied upon in the ruling.102 
The ruling states:  
Referring to Article 5, Howard S. Levie writes, “The present article was an 
attempt to eliminate, or at least to reduce, the number of instances in which 
military personnel in the field make an arbitrary decision that a captured 
individual is an illegal combatant and impose summary justice. . . . [it] 
assures the accused not only of a determination by a competent tribunal, but 
of a further judicial tribunal—but only if the detaining power proposes to try 
him for an offense arising out of hostilities.”103   
 
 The ruling misstates both the text and the meaning of the Levie passage.  The language 
presented in the ruling as a quotation is, in fact, an amalgam of language from two different 
subsections of the Levie book, with critical headings and sentences omitted, and interspersed 
with words that appear nowhere in the Levie text.   
                                                 
101 Howard S. Levie, Code of International Armed Conflict (1986).  At the US Naval War College, Howard Levie 
held the Stockton Chair of International Law in 1971-1972 and, later, was made “Adjunct Professor for Life.”  The 
Naval War College’s “Howard S. Levie Chair of Military Operational Law” was named to honor his contributions to 
the field.   
102 The ruling makes reference also to the official Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions.  Because the 
Commentaries are the official (though non-binding) elaboration of the Geneva Conventions, they are not a 
“secondary” source in the present sense.   See ___. 
103 United States v. Hamdan, Ruling on Defense Motion for Article 5 Status Determination (Allred, J.), (Dec. 17, 
2007), at 2 (citing HOWARD S. LEVIE, I THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 305–06 (1986)) (emphasis 
in ruling). 
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The ruling’s quotation of the language appearing before the ellipsis accurately reproduces 
Levie’s Comment on Article-5 tribunals.104  The trouble begins after the ellipses.   
The ruling presents the Levie material as one quotation “referring to Article 5,” when, in 
fact, the language after the ellipses is drawn from a separate subsection of the book, concerning 
Article 45(2).  Between the sentence before the ellipses in the ruling and the sentence after the 
ellipses, the original text contains: (1) a heading indicating that Levie is no longer talking about 
Article 5 “competent tribunal” at all but, rather, has moved to a discussion of an Article 45(2) 
“judicial tribunal”;105  (2) a full quotation of Article 45(2);106  (3) a free-standing paragraph, 
reading “SOURCE:  Article 45(2), 1977 Protocol I;”107 and, (4) several critical sentences of 
commentary distinguishing between the requirements of Article 5 and Article 45.108  (Images of 
the cited pages of the Levie text appear at pages 49-50, below.) 
 The alterations of the Levie text extend beyond those structural features of the 
text.  The ruling omits ten words and adds twelve words to the sentence that appears after 
the ellipses.  The passage, as written by Levie, reads:  “It assures him of a further 
determination of that question, this time by a judicial tribunal. . . .”109  The passage as 
presented in the ruling states: “[it] assures the accused not only of a determination by a 
competent tribunal, but of a further judicial tribunal. . . .”110  
The differences between those words add up to more than the sum of their parts.  
Levie’s actual language:  a “further [i.e., additional] determination of that question [i.e., 
                                                 
104 See HOWARD S. LEVIE, I THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 305 (1986) (the language in question 
appears in the “COMMENT on 741.8”).   
105 See id., at 305. 
106 Id. 
107 Id., at 306.   
108 See id. (the language in question appears in the “COMMENT on 741.9”). 
109 Id. 
110 United States v. Hamdan, Ruling on Defense Motion for Article 5 Status Determination (Allred, J.), (Dec. 17, 
2007), at 2 (emphasis in ruling). 
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combatant status], this time [i.e., a second “time”] by a judicial tribunal” clearly reflects 
the two-step procedure required under Article 45.  This point is obfuscated in the words 
presented in the ruling, which replace Levie’s clear language with the ambiguous 
locution, “not only of a determination by a competent tribunal, but of a further judicial 
tribunal.”   
At least as significant as the inaccuracies in the language that is “quoted” are the parts of 
the Levie passage that are omitted.  The ruling omits from the passage two sentences that run 
directly and actively contrary to the proposition that the Article 5 and Article 45(2) proceedings 
may be collapsed into one.  The excised sentences state: 
The present article [45(2)] presupposes that the “competent tribunal” of 
Articles [5 and 45(1)] has determined the individual concerned [was] not entitled 
to prisoner-of-war status. . . . 
It is unfortunate that the draftsmen used the phrase “is not held as a 
prisoner of war,” rather than using words stating expressly that “a competent 
tribunal has determined that he is not entitled to prisoner-of-war status.”111  
 
In other words, in material omitted from the passage, Levie explicitly states—and 
restates—that Article 45(2), in providing for a judicial adjudication of status, presupposes that 
there has been a prior determination of unlawful combatant status by a competent tribunal.  
Levie’s actual passage explicitly states that the international law of war requires a combatant 
status determination by a competent tribunal, to be followed by “a further determination of that 
question, this time, by a judicial tribunal”112 if the detainee is to be prosecuted for war crimes.  
Levie, in the actual passage, even offers a clearer wording to express the content of Article 45(2), 
lest his reader fail to grasp that a competent tribunal determination of combatant status is a 
necessary precursor to the operation of Article 45(2).  The unmistakable import of Levie’s 
                                                 
111 LEVIE, supra note 95, at 306 (within the “COMMENT”) (emphasis added).  
112 LEVIE, supra note 95, at 306. 
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language is that the Article 5 and Article 45 status determinations may not be collapsed into one 
proceeding.  
The following two pages are images of the cited pages of the Levie text.   
 
 (NB:  Howard Levie, for purposes of his “Code” of commentaries on the law of war, 
assigned his own system of article numbers to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the 
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions.  The cross-references from his numbering to 
the numbering in the POW Convention and Protocol I are indicated at the relevant points.) 
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Convention 
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to Article 4 of 
the POW 
Convention and 
Articles 43 & 
44 of Protocol I 
 51
After the Levie material is presented as concerning Article 5—with no mention of 
Article 45—the next paragraph of the ruling begins the words: “Discussing the same 
provision,”113 and proceeds with a discussion of status determinations under Article 5.  In 
the subsequent paragraph, the ruling states:      
When the drafters sought to clarify when such a determination should be made, 
there was disagreement.  “In view of the great differences in national justice 
procedures, it was not thought possible to establish a firm rule that this 
question [an accused’s status] must be decided before the trial for the offense, 
but it should be so decided if at all possible, because on it depends the whole 
array of procedural protections accorded to Prisoners of War, by the Third 
Convention, and the issue may go to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.”  Yves 
Sandoz et. al, eds. Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, International Committee of the 
Red Cross (Geneva 1987) at 556.114 
 
But that quoted paragraph, presented as concerning “the drafters” of Article 5, in fact has nothing 
to do with Article 5 or its drafters.  Rather, the passage quoted is from the Commentary to Article 
45(2) of Protocol I.  Inexplicably, while presented in the ruling as a discussion of “the same 
provision” (referring to Article 5), the quotation is correctly cited in the ruling as coming from 
the Commentary to Protocol I.  Even that citation, however, makes no mention of Article 45.     
 The conflation of Articles 5 and 45 is, by now, complete—and lays the groundwork for 
the holding that, “The hearing [that] the Commission will undertake to determine whether the 
accused is an alien unlawful enemy combatant, and therefore subject to the Commission’s 
jurisdiction[,] will also determine his status for the purposes of Article 5.”115   
The two-for-one solution reached in the December 17 Hamdan ruling is inconsistent with 
the law of war and with a proper interpretation of the MCA.  Both of those sources of law 
demand a competent tribunal determination of unlawful combatant status as a prerequisite to 
                                                 
113 United States v. Hamdan, Ruling on Defense Motion for Article 5 Status Determination (Allred, J.), (Dec. 17, 
2007), at 2.   
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 4. 
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military commission jurisdiction; and, both require a subsequent judicial adjudication of 
combatant status for a detainee who is held as a non-POW and is to be tried for crimes arising 
out of the hostilities.”116 
The December 17 ruling commits a second serious violation of the law of war, briefly 
mentioned earlier.  The ruling unlawfully relies on a “concession” by the defense as a waiver of 
Hamdan’s right to an Article 5 competent tribunal composed of more than one person.  Rights 
under the POW Convention are absolutely non-waivable.117  No purported waiver of rights under 
the POW Convention may lawfully be given effect.118   
At the time of the December 17, 2007 ruling, Hamdan was entitled to the rights afforded 
under the POW Convention.  As Judge Allred himself noted in the ruling, “[b]ecause the accused 
has not yet been determined to be an alien unlawful enemy combatant by any tribunal, this section 
[MCA §948b(g)] does not apply to defeat his right to rely on the Geneva Conventions for the 
purposes of determining his status.” 119 
Central among those POW-Convention rights was Hamdan’s right to presumptive lawful 
combatant status unless and until a contrary determination was made by a competent tribunal.  
Judge Allred correctly states that a qualified Article-5, competent tribunal must be composed of 
more than one person.120  Indeed, Judge Allred observes that, in the drafting of Article 5, the text 
was amended to employ the term “military tribunal” rather than “competent authority,” to reflect 
precisely this composition requirement.  As Judge Allred notes, “[t]his amendment was based on 
                                                 
116 Michael Herr, OBSERVER (London, Jan. 15, 1989) 
117 See POW Convention, art 7. 
118 See id. 
119 See United States v. Hamdan, Ruling on Defense Motion for Article 5 Status Determination (Allred, J.), (Dec. 17, 
2007) at 4. 
120 See supra text accompanying notes 17 and 18.   
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the view that decisions which might have the gravest consequences should not be left to a single 
person.”121  
 Judge Allred, nevertheless, rules that he, sitting alone, will serve as an Article 5 tribunal.  
The jurisdictional hearing that he will conduct, the ruling says, “will also determine [Hamdan’s] 
status for the purposes of Article 5.”122   
In holding that his sole decision will serve “for purposes of Article 5”—while 
simultaneously acknowledging the composition requirement of Article 5—Judge Allred appears 
to rely on a theory of waiver.  In the sentence preceding the one stating that Judge Allred will sit 
as an Article-5 tribunal, the ruling states that, the “parties have conceded that this Commission is 
a competent tribunal within the meaning of Article 5.”123  At oral argument, Joe McMillan, 
civilian counsel for Hamdan, did indeed state that Judge Allred could, sitting alone, serve as an 
Article 5 tribunal.  The colloquy was as follows.124 
Judge Allred: “How would an Article 5 tribunal proceeding differ from what we would 
conduct this afternoon?”125  Mr. McMillan responded that, if sitting as a competent tribunal, the 
commission should consider all six bases for lawful combatant status specified in the POW 
Convention and not only the three of those bases included in the MCA.126  Judge Allred: “I take 
it that you concede that this Court is a competent tribunal.”127  Lacking a definite response to that 
                                                 
121 United States v. Hamdan, Ruling on Defense Motion for Article 5 Status Determination (Allred, J.), (Dec. 17, 
2007) at 2 (quoting the Commentary to the POW Convention). 
122 Id.  
123 See United States v. Hamdan, Ruling on Defense Motion for Article 5 Status Determination (Allred, J.), (Dec. 17, 
2007) at 4 (emphasis added). 
124 Contemporaneous notes of author taken at Military Commission Hearing on the Defense Motion for an Article 5 
Tribunal, United States v. Hamdan, (Dec. 5-6, 2007 Guantanamo Bay, Cuba).  TO BE REPLACED WITH 
QUOTES FROM TRANSCRIPT.   
125 Supra note 89. 
126 Id. 
    Explain re the 6 v. the 3. 
127 Id. 
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question, Judge Allred asked (after a brief digression), “Do you agree that this commission can 
be a competent tribunal?”128  Mr. McMillan: “Yes.”129  
Of course, Judge Allred knows that he, sitting alone, cannot constitute “a competent 
tribunal within the meaning of Article 5.”  Indeed, he has explained why an Article 5 tribunal 
must be composed of more than one person.  But, apparently treating Hamdan’s “concession”—
at oral argument—as a waiver of the Article 5 composition requirement, Judge Allred holds that 
he will sit as an Article 5 tribunal. 
Hamdan cannot “concede” a part of his Article-5 right to a combatant status 
determination by a competent tribunal composed of more than one person.  Article 7 of the POW 
Convention, entitled “Non-Renunciation of Rights,” states:  “Prisoners of war may in no 
circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present 
convention.”130  A purported waiver of POW rights is, thus, a legal nullity.  It provides no 
justification for abrogation of the right purportedly waived.   
The POW Convention bars any waiver of POW rights because those rights would be 
nearly meaningless if they were waivable, given the ease with which duress can be applied to 
detainees.131  The bar to the waiver of POW rights is crucial in safeguarding those rights.  To 
give legal effect to their purported waiver creates a dangerous precedent, discarding the shield 
that protects all the other POW rights. 
Judge Allred was bound by the CMCR’s Khadr opinion when he issued the December 17 
ruling in Hamdan.  The CMCR’s Khadr opinion constrained Judge Allred’s ability to interpret 
the MCA in accordance with the law of war and the Charming Betsy canon.  The CMCR opinion 
                                                 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 POW Convention, supra note 13, art. 7 (emphasis added). 
131 See, COMMENTARY TO THE POW CONVENTION, supra note 13 at 89.  
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required Judge Allred to exercise initial jurisdiction to determine the commission’s jurisdiction.  
Nevertheless, Judge Allred had three options that would have allowed him to rule consistently 
with the CMCR while also protecting and remaining faithful to the law of war. 
First, in exercising initial jurisdiction to adjudicate Hamdan’s motion challenging 
personal jurisdiction—as the CMCR opinion required—Judge Allred might have held that the 
military commission lacked jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings because, never having 
had a status determination by a competent tribunal, Hamdan was a presumptively lawful 
combatant—and would remain so until that presumptive status was rebutted by an Article 5 
competent tribunal composed of more than one person.  Second, Judge Allred, if he found it 
impossible to comply the CMCR decision while also complying with the MCA and the law of 
war, might have said so—holding in accordance with the CMCR, while also elucidating the 
problems in so holding. 
Or third, Judge Allred might have ruled (on his own motion, since the parties did not 
raise this point) that the military commission lacked personal jurisdiction over Hamdan because 
the charges against Hamdan were jurisdictionally defective when sworn.  The MCA states that, 
“military commissions under this chapter shall not have jurisdiction over lawful enemy 
combatants.”132  Until a competent tribunal determines otherwise, a detained combatant is legally 
presumed to be a lawful enemy combatant.133  Rule for Military Commission (RMC) 202(c) 
states:  “The jurisdiction of a military commission over an individual attaches upon the swearing 
of charges.”134  Since the MCA prohibits military commission jurisdiction over lawful 
combatants, and military commission jurisdiction attaches upon the swearing of charges, a 
detainee’s presumptive lawful combatant status would have to be rebutted—by a competent 
                                                 
132 Id. § 948d(b).  
133 See supra 14. 
134 RMC 202(c).  
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tribunal’s determination of unlawful combatant status—before military commission charges 
could lawfully be sworn against that person and military commission jurisdiction, consequently, 
attach.  
RMC 905(b) governs motions concerning defective charges.  In this section of the RMC, 
the swearing of charges is referred to as the “preferral” of charges, a synonymous term in 
military practice.135 
RMC 905. Motions generally 
(b) Pre-trial motions.  . . . .  The following must be raised before a plea is 
entered: 
(1) Defenses or objections based on defects (other than jurisdictional defects) 
in the preferral, forwarding, investigation, or referral of charges. . . . 
Discussion 
Such nonjurisdictional defects include unsworn charges and inadequate pre-
trial advice.  
(2) Defenses or objections based on defects in the charges and specifications 
(other than any failure to show jurisdiction or to charge an offense, which 
objections shall be resolved by the military judge at any time during the 
pendency of the proceedings).136 
 
As reflected in RMC 905(b), a defect in preferred charges may be jurisdictional or 
nonjurisdictional.  As an example of a non-jurisdictional defect in preferred charges, the RMC 
offers, “unsworn charges.”  (The RMC offers no examples of a defect in preferred charges that 
would be jurisdictional.)  Preferral of charges against a person legally presumed to be a lawful 
enemy combatant would be a prime example of a jurisdictionally defective preferral under a 
statute that plainly states:  “Military commissions under this chapter shall not have jurisdiction 
over lawful enemy combatants.”137 
  No independent action by the convening authority or the military commission judge can 
cure that jurisdictional defect in the preferral.  A detained enemy combatant remains a 
                                                 
135 MCM 307  
136 RMC 905(b) (emphasis added) (internal references omitted). 
137 10 U.S.C. § 948d(b). 
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presumptively lawful combatant—over whom military commission jurisdiction may not attach 
under the MCA—unless and until the presumption of lawful combatant status is rebutted by a 
competent tribunal.  In the absence of such a competent-tribunal determination, the accused is 
legally presumed to be a lawful combatant over whom, the MCA explicitly states, military 
commission jurisdiction may not attach. 
The preferral of military commission charges against a presumptively lawful combatant 
is not some merely “technical” defect to be cured, nunc pro tunc, later on.  The attachment of 
jurisdiction begins the process of prosecution.  The accused is informed that he will be tried by 
military commission for specified crimes.138  A defense lawyer is assigned;139 and discovery 
begins.140  Charges are amended and referred141—as capital or non-capital cases142—by the 
convening authority.  Pretrial proceedings commence.143  With each step, the power of the 
military commission is exercised; the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and the convening 
authority take actions with potentially profound consequences for the detainee.  
Among the consequences of the attachment of military commission jurisdiction is the 
exclusion of the detainee from the Administrative Review Board (ARB) process.  The ARB is 
“an administrative review process to assess annually the need to continue to detain each enemy 
combatant.”144  ARB review entails the possibility of release, repatriation, or amelioration of the 
conditions of custody for detainees deemed “no longer a threat to the United States and its 
                                                 
138 See 10 U.S.C. § 948q(b); R.M.C. 308.. 
139 See 10 U.S.C. § 948k(3). 
140 See R.M.C. 701. 
141 See R.M.C. 407. 
142 See R.M.C. 601(e). 
143 R.M.C. 707. 
144 Paul Wolfowitz, Order for Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants in the Control of the 
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, at 1 (May 11, 2004) available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2004/d20040518gtmoreview.pdf. 
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allies.”145  Upon attachment of military commission jurisdiction, the accused are “excepted from 
the [ARB] procedures . . . until the disposition of any charges against them or the service of any 
sentence imposed by a military commission.”146  The preferral of military commission charges 
is, thus, in several respects, an extremely serious matter, the deleterious consequences of which 
commence, for the detainee, immediately upon the preferral (swearing) of those charges.   
The charges preferred against Mr. Hamdan—a presumptively lawful combatant—were 
jurisdictionally defective.  He has, nevertheless, by the date of this writing, been convicted—on 
five out of ten counts chargerd—and sentenced.  Pursuant to carefully and well constructed panel 
instructions, and with credit for time served thoughtfully ensured by Judge Allred, the sentence 
amounted to five months of prison time remaining at the time the sentence was announced. 
Legal developments on personal jurisdiction under the MCA clearly have not come to a 
resting place.  Judge Brownback’s June 4, 2007 ruling dismissing the charges against Omar 
Khadr correctly applied the MCA and the law of war.  It did not, though, provide a full 
articulation of the reasons or the legal support for the outcome.  The subsequent decisions on 
personal jurisdiction under the MCA, issued by the CMCR and by Judge Allred, have been, in 
important way s, inconsistent with the law of war and with a proper interpretation of the MCA.  
Those precedents, if left uncorrected, will do substantial damage to POW protections. 
V.  The Current Posture:  Preferring Defects 
Every case brought, to date, under the MCA has rested on a jurisdictionally defective 
preferral.  Each charge was jurisdictionally defective when preferred, having been preferred 
against a person legally presumed to be a lawful enemy combatant, even while the MCA 
explicitly prohibits military commission jurisdiction over a lawful enemy combatant. 
                                                 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 4. 
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The Guantanamo military commission proceedings, to date, have thus been ultra vires; 
they have exceeded the scope of the commissions’ lawful authority.  The proceedings to date 
have lacked legislative authorization.  They are not the proceedings that Congress authorized in 
the Military Commissions Act of 2006. 
VI.  Conclusion 
When the MCA is read as a whole and in conjunction with the international law of war, 
its jurisdictional structure is revealed to be both logically consistent and consistent with the law 
of war.   
The law of war has developed over centuries—and, particularly, during the past few 
decades—with the support, and often at the initiative, of the United States.  The safeguards of 
Articles 5 and 45 that are eroded by the CMCR’s 2007 Khadr opinion and further eroded in the 
December 17 military-commission ruling in Hamdan were developed in response to the 
mistreatment of American service members in Korea and Vietnam, and were designed to protect 
POW rights in the future.   
Recalling the brutalities that led to the negotiation of Protocol I, George Aldrich, head of 
the US delegation in those negotiations, commented in 2002:  “When [Article 45(2)] was 
negotiated, the United States government was painfully aware of the experiences in Korea and 
Vietnam, where many American military personnel were mistreated by their captors and denied 
POW status by mere allegations that they were all criminals.  Time evidently dulls memory.”147 
The law of war is a long-term proposition.  The purposes motivating US support for 
Article 45(2) are as significant now as they were in the aftermath of the Korean and Vietnam 
wars.  As Michael Herr has cogently observed, “All the wrong people remember Vietnam.  I 
                                                 
147 Aldrich, supra note 25, at 898 [internal citations omitted]. 
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think all the people who remember it should forget it, and all the people who forgot it should 
remember it.”148   
This should be an easy call.  The MCA provisions on personal jurisdiction provide for 
compliance with the law of war and, indeed, demand it.  What is required to achieve a coherent 
interpretation of the MCA’s personal jurisdiction framework, to comply with that framework, 
and to protect POW rights and fulfill US obligations under the law of war is simply to conduct a 
handful of combatant status determinations before competent tribunals.  The cost of non-
compliance is very high; and, the cost of compliance is miniscule. 
                                                 
148 Michael Herr, Observer ( Jan. 15, 1989). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
SALIM AHMED HAMDAN 
 
RULING ON DEFENSE MOTION FOR 
ARTICLE 5 STATUS DETERMINATION 
 
17 December 2007 
 
 
The Defense has moved this Commission to make a status determination, as required by 
Article 5 of the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter 
GPW), or that the charges against him be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The 
Defense argues that the accused has claimed to be entitled to Prisoner of War Status, that as a 
result he is not subject to trial by Military Commission absent a determination of his status, and 
that the burden of proof in any such determination is upon the Government, beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The Government opposes the motion, arguing alternatively that the Accused is not 
entitled to an Article 5 status determination because GPW is implemented by the Military 
Commissions Act and does not apply; that if it does apply, the accused's October 2004 CSRT 
hearing satisfies it; and finally, that this Commission can hear the evidence and perform the 
Article 5 determination. The Government disputes the Defense contention that it must prove 
jurisdiction '''beyond a reasonable doubt", and argues that the correct standard is "preponderance 
of the evidence." 
 
 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
Having read the written briefs of both parties, and carefully reviewed the authorities cited 
in each, the Commission concludes that the burden upon the Government in an initial showing of 
jurisdiction is preponderance of the evidence. RMC 905(c)(I); United States v. Khadr, (CMCR 
07-001, 24, 25). At trial, if the accused raises a affirmative defense, such as the defense of lawful 
combatancy, the Government will be required to disprove that defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. RMC 9l6(b). United States v. Khadr, at 7. Thus, the burden of demonstrating that the 
accused is subject to the jurisdiction of this Commission is on the Government, by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
 
 
ENTITLEMENT TO AN ARTICLE 5 STATUS DETERMINATION 
 
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, by which the United States is bound, provides: 
'''The Present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the time 
they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final release and repatriation. 
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and 
having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belongs to any of the categories enumerated in Article 
4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their 
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status has been determined by a competent tribunal."  
 
Referring to Article 5, Howard S. Levie writes "The present article was an attempt to 
eliminate, or at least to reduce, the number of instances in which military personnel in the field 
make an arbitrary decision that a captured individual is an illegal combatant and impose 
summary justice . . . . [it] assures the accused not only of a determination by a competent 
tribunal, but of a further judicial tribunal-but only if the detaining power proposes to try him 
for an offense arising out of the hostilities." Howard S. Levie, The Code of International Armed 
Conflict, Vol. I, Oceana Publications, (Rome, London, New York: 1986) at 305-6 (emphasis 
added). 
 
Discussing the same provision, Jean S. Pictet of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross described the deliberations in these terms "At Geneva in 1949, it was first proposed that 
for the sake of precision the term "responsible authority" should be replaced by "military 
tribunal". This amendment was based on the view that decisions which might have the gravest 
consequences should not be left to a single person, who might often be of subordinate rank. The 
matter should be taken to a court, as persons taking part in the fight without the right to do so are 
liable to be prosecuted for murder or attempted murder, and might even be sentenced to capital 
punishment ..." Jean S. Pictet, Commentary Relative to the Treatment o/Prisoners o/War, III. 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 1960 at 77 (emphasis added). 
 
When the drafters sought to clarify when such a determination should be made, there was 
disagreement. "In view of the great differences in national judicial procedures, it was not thought 
possible to establish a firm rule that this question [an accused's status] must be decided before 
the trial for the offense, but it should be so decided if at all possible, because on it depends the 
whole array of procedural protections accorded to Prisoners of War, by the Third Convention, 
and the issue may go to the jurisdiction of the tribunal." Yves Sandoz et. aI, eds. Commentary on 
the Additional Protocols o.f8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1949, 
International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva 1987) at 556. 
 
These authorities suggest that the United States is bound not only to perform an initial 
status determination, such as that provided for under Army Regulation 190-8, but a second, 
judicial, determination when it proposes to try an detainee for his participation in hostilities. The 
Government argues that "he has done nothing to trigger" Article 5, but the Commission finds 
that his claim of entitlement to POW status, made by his counsel before this tribunal, is sufficient 
to do so. It further finds that because the United States, as Detaining Power, proposes to try the 
accused for his participation in hostilities, the Geneva Conventions clearly contemplated a 
judicial determination of his status before any such proceeding. 
 
Congress was clearly aware of these treaty obligations under Article 5 when it debated 
and enacted the Military Commissions Act. Congress clearly intended that the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal (CSRT) would satisfy the requirements of Article 5. Senator Lindsey Graham 
characterized CSRT's as "Article 5 tribunals on steroids". 151 Congo Rec. S12,754 (daily ed. 
Nov 14, 2005), and the Government concedes that there was a "bipartisan consensus" that the 
CSRT would satisfy the requirements of Article 5. In support of this concession, the Government 
invites the Commission's attention to this colloquy: 
2 
"SEN Graham: Okay, now, we have a CSRT procedure that Senator Levin and myself 
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and others worked on that deals with determining enemy combatant status. This is a non-criminal 
procedure that is designed to comply with ... Article 5 of the Geneva Convention, a competent 
tribunal. Does everyone on the panel believe that the CSRT procedures ... as constituted, meet 
[] the test of what the Geneva Convention had in mind as determining status? 
GEN Romig: Yes, Sir. 
GEN. Black: Yes, Sir. 
SEN Graham: ... Not only does it meet the test, it's gotten better over time... Not only 
did we put in place the CSRT ... procedure that would comply with Geneva Convention status 
determination competent tribunal standards, we also allowed civilian review of those decisions 
for the first time....'" Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Military 
Commissions in Light of the Supreme Court Decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, S. Hrg. 1090-881, 
at 62-63 (July 13, 2006). Elsewhere in the Congressional Record, Senator Kyl opined that the 
CSRT process would satisfy Article 5' s requirement of a status determination before a competent 
tribunal, and give even more protections than Article 5 requires. Id., at S10,268. 
It is clear to the Commission that Congress intended that the accused have an Article 5 
status determination in any case in which his status was in doubt, and that it intended the CSRT 
process to make such a determination. 
 
DID THE ACCUSED'S OCTOBER 2004 CSRT SATISFY ARTICLE 5? 
The CSRT held in this case was governed by a Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Memorandum dated 7 July 2004 and a Secretary of the Navy Order dated 29 July 2004. The 
Report of the CSRT, dated 8 October 2004, concludes in pertinent part that: 
"2. (U) On 3 October 2004, the Tribunal determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that [the accused] is properly designated as an enemy combatant as defined in [DEPSECDEF 
Memo of7 July 2004]. 
3. (lJ) In particular, the Tribunal finds that this detainee is a member of, or affiliated with, 
al-Qaida forces, as more fully discussed in the enclosures." 
It is clear from a reading of the balance of the CSRT Report that the panel members 
found Hamdan to be an "enemy combatant" because of his membership in al-Qaeda, and because 
he had been employed by Osama bin-Ladin as a bodyguard and driver. The CSRT did not 
address his entitlement to Prisoner of War Status, cite or discuss the Geneva Conventions or 
A11icle 5, or address the lawfulness of the accused's participation in hostilities. Indeed, it was not 
tasked to do so, the DEPSECDEF and SECNAV Memoranda having ordered the CSRT to make 
a different determination: whether the accused was an "enemy combatant", as defined in those 
references, for purposes of continuing his detention. As a consequence, this Commission cannot 
accept the 2004 CSRT determination that the accused is properly detained as an "enemy 
combatant" in satisfaction of the required determination regarding his entitlement to Prisoner of 
War Status. Even if the Commission were to agree with the Government that the 2004 CSRT 
process satisfied Article 5, it is clear from the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions that a 
second status determination must be made by a judicial officer for detainees the Detaining Power 
proposes to punish. 
 
Both parties have conceded that this Commission is a competent tribunal within the 
meaning of Article 5. The hearing the Commission will undertake to determine whether the 
accused is an alien unlawful enemy combatant, and therefore subject to the Commission’s 
jurisdiction will also determine his status for the purposes of Article 5. This procedure is fully 
consistent with the intent of Congress., the Law of Armed Conflict., and the decision of the Court 
of rv1ilitary Commission Review in United States v. Khadr. 
 
The Commission notes the terms of MCA §948b(g)., which provide "No alien unlawful 
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enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the 
Geneva Conventions as a source of rights." Because the accused has not yet been determined to 
be an alien unlawful enemy combatant by any tribunal., this section does not apply to defeat his 
right to rely on the Geneva Conventions for the purposes of determining his status. 
 
The Defense Motion for an Article 5 Status Determination is GRANTED. 
 
So Ordered this 17th day of December., 2007. 
 
Keith Allred 
Captain., JAGC., US Navy 
Military Judge 
 
 
 
